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Comments
Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting
the Civil Rights Act Down to Size
The historical development of the Civil Rights Act of 1871' has
been a remarkable one. Until comparatively recent years, the stat-
ute was mired in obscurity and construed, when construed at all,
more narrowly than the fourteenth amendment it was designed to
implement.2 By the twentieth century it was doubtful whether the
statute was still in force.'
Due in large measure to the Supreme Court decisions in Hague
v. CIO,4 Monroe v. Pape,5 and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,I
private rights of action based on section 1983 began to flood federal
tribunals.7 This phenomenon, which one federal judge termed a
"mad rush to the federal court,"8 significantly altered the fabric of
1. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Civil Rights Act or 19831.
2. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 507-12 (1939) (Roberts, J.) (jurisdiction avail-
able only to plaintiffs proving violation of privileges and immunities clause); id. at 531-32
(Stone, J., concurring) (§ 1343(3) unavailable for deprivation of property rights). See also
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211-12 & n.16, 213-18, 224-39 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that "under color" of state law in § 1983 is narrower than "state action" in
fourteenth amendment).
3. See Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900) ("fa]ssuming [§§ 1983 and
1343(3)1 are still in force, it is sufficient to say that they refer to civil rights only and are
inapplicable" to a claim seeking to enjoin state taxation of patent rights).
4. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
5. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
7. As of September 1976, 772 pages of § 1983 cases were listed at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). In fiscal year 1960, the year before Monroe, there were approximately 300 actions
filed under the general heading of civil rights. See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REV. 1,
1 & n.2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McCormack].
8. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on
Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. 0. 557, 559 [hereinafter
cited as Aldisert]. Judge Aldisert is a Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
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our federal system.9 In addition to the burdensome amount of litiga-
tion entering the federal courts, federal scrutiny of conduct under
color of state law to determine whether it complies with the dictates'
of the Constitution frequently exacerbates federal-state relations.
This past term the United States Supreme Court took giant
strides to reduce these problems which had alarmed many. 0 Begin-
ning with the landmark case of Rizzo v. Goode," itself portending
an entire new approach to federal-state relations as well as section
1983 litigation, the Burger Court has decided a number of cases
which will result in either precluding litigants from bringing a sec-
tion 1983 suit to federal court or persuading them to refer to state
courts for adjudication of their claims. By balancing the preroga-
tives of the states and the roles of the federal courts as the primary
guarantor of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, the Su-
preme Court has attempted to avoid the strains resulting from fed-
eral intervention by reducing section 1983 litigation. It is a balance
vastly dissimilar to that fashioned by the Warren Court, and one
that civil libertarians fear represents an abnegation of the federal
judiciary's role to vindicate constitutional rights when the state or
its representatives are responsible for their deprivation.'
The Court did not accomplish this change in one broad sweep, but
through a number of cases, each dealing with a different aspect of
section 1983. It did not overrule Monroe, Lynch, or any of the other
major section 1983 precedents which had opened the doors of the
federal courts to a wide variety of suits. Each case was grounded in
policy considerations, or distinguished from analogous cases which
had upheld suits under the Civil Rights Act. Furthermore, each
decision, when viewed individually, could be read to have little
effect on the general tenor of 1983 litigation. But when the decisions
are viewed from an overall perspective, what emerges is a Supreme
Court view of section 1983 distinct from the Court's perspective less
than a decade ago. The purpose of this comment is to examine these
recent decisions and their effect on the 1983 litigant to determine
whether the usefulness of section 1983 as a federal statute capable
of redressing constitutional rights has been jeopardized. This com-
9. McCormack, supra note 7, at 1-2.
10. See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HAMv. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
11. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
12. See New York Times, Apr. 7, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
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ment concludes with a proposed alternative for a less drastic change
in section 1983 rights than the Court's recent decisions suggest, one
that seeks to preserve the vitality of the federal statute while reduc-
ing the present burden on the federal courts.
Introduction
A major reason section 1983 was historically ignored as a means
of vindicating constitutionally protected rights was an early conclu-
sion by the Supreme Court that an act not authorized by state law
was neither "state action" nor action "under color of state law."' 3
Although that holding was largely undermined 4 and eventually
overruled 5 as it related to state action 6 for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment, section 1983's "under color" language was still
thought to encompass only action authorized by state law. In
Monroe v. Pape, ' 7 however, the Supreme Court removed this restric-
tion by holding that Congress intended to include within the ambit
of section 1983 conduct by state officials who acted beyond their
statutory authority. 8
13. Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904) (since complaint alleged that city's
construction of tunnel was illegal and unauthorized, city's action was not state action within
intent and meaning of the fourteenth amendment).
14. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (1944) (noting that Barney has been severely
restricted); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-89 (1913) (distin-
guishing Barney and noting that when a state officer misuses his authority, the fourteenth
amendment can redress the wrong whether or not the state authorized the conduct).
15. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960).
16. The fourteenth amendment speaks only to actions by the state. Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) ("that private action is immune from the restrictions
of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established"). Although the "under color" language is
peculiar to the Civil Rights Act, the term is synonymous with state action for purposes of §
1983. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). Accord, Berrios v. Inter
American Univ., 409 F. Supp. 769, 770-72 (D.P.R. 1975), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 2665
(1976) (holding that university's actions were not under color of state law but relying on
Supreme Court cases on state action). When state action is found lacking, however, neither
the fourteenth amendment nor § 1983 is available to redress allegedly unconstitutional con-
duct. See, e.g., Ford v. Harris County Medical Soc., 535 F.2d 321, 322 (5th Cir. 1976) (dismiss-
ing suit against county medical society because 1983 cause of action requires "state involve-
ment"); Acosta v. Tyrone Hosp., 410 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (for hospital to be
liable under § 1983 plaintiff must show that hospital and state were, in effect, joint partici-
pants in the challenged activity). Accord, Lewis v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corr., 533
F.2d 710, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no cause of action under § 1983 can exist against District of
Columbia officials). For further analysis of the "under color" language of § 1983 see Adickes
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 210-21 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. Id. at 172. The plaintiffs in Monroe alleged that the defendants, city police officers,
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Other restrictions on the use of section 1983 derived from narrow
constructions of the scope of protectible interests under that sec-
tion 9 and its jurisdictional counterpart. 20 In a plurality opinion in
Hague v. CIO,"' however, Justice Stone sought to liberate the stat-
utes from the view that they were unavailable in cases where only
violations of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
were alleged. 22 His view that the substantive rights protected by
section 1983 were as broad as those protected by the fourteenth
amendment itself ultimately prevailed in Monroe.2 3 Finally, in
broke into their home without a warrant, searched and ransacked the premises, and subjected
them to various indignities. Borrowing language from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941), which had construed the criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the Court
characterized the conduct as a "[mlisuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." 365 U.S. at
184. The fact that the authorities allegedly transgressed their authority under state law made
their conduct no less actionable under section 1983.
19. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89
HARv. L. REV. 922, 949-51 (1976). See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-43 (1952).
20. Section 1343(3) gives the district court original jurisdiction to hear any civil action
brought
to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Section 1343(3) has no amount in controversy requirement as does
§ 1331. See note 22 infra. Hence, while a claim against a federal official for a constitutional
deprivation must meet the statutory amount in controversy requirement, see District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973), the same conduct where the defendant is a state
official is subject to no such requirement.
21. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
22. Id. at 518-20, 524-27 (concurring opinion). Justice Stone also attempted to dispel the
view that the general federal question statute enacted after § 1343(3), now codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), had superceded it so that an action alleging the deprivation of a
fourteenth amendment right must satisfy § 1331's amount in controversy requirement. 307
U.S. at 527-32. However, he found it necessary to reconcile the two jurisdictional statutes by
theorizing that § 1983 and § 1343(3) were not available to protect against deprivations of
property rights; a plaintiff could avail himself of these statutes only in cases of alleged
deprivations of personal liberty. Id. at 531-32. A number of circuits had followed Hague's
liberty/property dichotomy until its rejection in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
542-46 (1972). See National Land & Invest. Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1970); Eisen
v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. 365 U.S. at 171. This aspect of Monroe, combined with the Court's holding that action
illegal under state law was actionable under § 1983, finally brought the "under color" cover-
age of § 1983 into line with the expanded sweep accorded the "state action" requirement ot
the fourteenth amendment nearly half a century earlier in Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-89 (1913). See note 14 supra.
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Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,24 a unanimous Supreme Court
repudiated Justice Stone's view in Hague that 1983 jurisdiction was
limited to cases involving "personal liberty" rights,25 and held it
available to redress deprivations of property rights as well."5
In addition to this expansion of the scope of protectible interests
encompassed within the Civil Rights Act, other factors contributed
to increasing the number of 1983 suits entering the federal courts.
First, incorporation 7 of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment secured
these rights against action under color of state law. Thus, many
wrongs of an individual nature previously actionable only in state
tort actions against state officials were brought within the ambit of
section 1983. Second, in Monroe Justice Douglas stated that when
a complainant seeks redress under section 1983 in federal court,
"[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one
is invoked. '" Supreme Court cases after Monroe indicated that the
adequacy of the state remedy did not bar federal relief. 9 Conse-
quently, exhaustion of admittedly adequate state remedies was not
a prerequisite to maintaining a 1983 suit in federal court. 0
24. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 405 U.S. at 542-46. One federal judge expressed his view of the implications of the
decision: "Lynch, unfortunately, has made the federal court a nickel and dime court. A
litigant now has a passport to federal court if he has a 5-dollar property claim and can find
some state action." Aldisert, supra note 8, at 569.
27. Since the first amendment was "selectively" incorporated into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), a variety of other
provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See,
e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment right against double jeop-
ardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment).
28. 365 U.S. at 183. In Monroe, Justice Douglas identified three principal aims of § 1983:
(1) to override certain kinds of state law; (2) to provide a remedy where state law was in-
adequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy was adequate in
theory but unavailable in practice. 365 U.S. at 173-74. Another purpose of § 1983 was recog-
nized two years later in McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See note 30 infro.
29. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974); Damico v. California, 389 U.S.
416, 417 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
30. The no exhaustion rule was recognized as a purpose of § 1983 in McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963): "We would defeat [the] purposes [of section 1983] if we held
that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the
same claim in a state court." Id. at 672. McNeese involved a suit for injunctive relief under
1976
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In short, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of the "under
color" language of 1983, expanded under the rubric of incorporation
the interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, and refused
to require litigants to first seek redress in state court regardless of
the importance of the state interests involved. The deluge of section
1983 litigation entering the federal courts was, in a sense, invited.
This term, however, the Supreme Court issued notice that its "una-
bashed love affair with the Civil Rights Act of 1871"1 has ended.
I. Rizzo v. Goode: THE OPENING VOLLEY
Rizzo v. Goode32 involved a number of class actions brought
under section 1983 by individuals and various organizations against
the mayor of Philadelphia, the police commissioner and other pub-
lic officials.3 The suits alleged a pervasive pattern of unconstitu-
tional police mistreatment of minority citizens in particular and
Philadelphia residents in general. The defendants were charged
with misconduct ranging from express authorization and encourage-
ment of the mistreatment, to failure to take affirmative steps to
avoid its recurrence. The individual patrolmen involved in the inci-
dents were not named as defendants. The gravamen of the plain-
tiffs' complaint was that their only available administrative rem-
edy, a disciplinary hearing after the fact, was inadequate to protect
their constitutional rights and that the inadequacy was due to the
defendants' failure to formulate and oversee effective disciplinary
sanctions.
section 1983. The lower courts refused the requested relief for failure to exhaust state admin-
istrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the remedy was inadequate
because it would only result in a state court action which would not foreclose suit in federal
court. 373 U.S. at 674-76. Thus, in an equitable action, the Court upheld the principle Monroe
had established for damage suits under section 1983: state judicial relief need not be ex-
hausted prior to initiating federal suit.
Besides its refusal to require a 1983 litigant to pursue state judicial remedies, the McNeese
Court strongly intimated that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is also not re-
quired, at least when they are inadequate. 373 U.S. at 675-76. In Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S.
802, 814 (1974), Justice Douglas apparently merged the two, simply stating there was no
requirement that petitioners exhaust their "state remedies." See also notes 245 & 246 infra.
One commentator has questioned whether a no exhaustion rule was a purpose of the Civil
Rights Act as originally passed. Note, supra note 10, at 1491.
31. Aldisert, supra note 8, at 563.
32. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
33. Id. at 364-65 n.1.
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The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's choice of relief-a
mandatory injunction 3-based on its belief that the ordered revi-
sions to the complaint processing procedures had the potential to
prevent future police misconduct.35 The Supreme Court reversed on
several alternative grounds. First, the Court had "serious doubts"
whether the requisite article IH case or controversy existed between
the plaintiffs and the individually named defendants. Second, it
felt that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a pervasive pattern
of intimidation by the defendants, or that through the defendants'
own conduct the plaintiffs had been deprived of a constitutional
right.3 1 In addition, however, the Court held that notions of federal-
ism and comity counselled against federal intervention in the func-
tioning of state governmental agencies. The mandatory injunction
was characterized as an "unwarranted intrusion by the federal judi-
ciary into the police department's discretionary authority to per-
form their official functions."3
A. Appropriateness of the Relief Granted
Of primary concern to the Supreme Court was the district court's
choice of an equitable remedy. Traditionally, injunctive relief to
protect constitutional rights has not been viewed as an extraordi-
34. Council of Organizations on Phila. Police Acc. & Resp. v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289
(E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub noma. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S.
362 (1976). The district court found that although the evidence did not establish an actual
departmental policy to deprive minority citizens of their constitutional rights, the filing of
civilian complaints was discouraged and the department tended to minimize the conse-
quences of police misconduct. The district court was convinced it was dealing with more than
"rare, isolated instances" of deprivations of constitutional rights. 357 F. Supp. at 1319. Its
choice of equitable relief was a mandatory injunction directed at the police administration,
requiring it to submit a plan for comprehensive revision of complaint processing procedures.
Id. at 1321.
35. 506 F.2d at 548.
36. 423 U.S. at 371-73. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the individual respon-
dents alleged that the petitioners had engaged in discriminatory bond setting, sentencing,
and assessment of jury fees in the administration of the state criminal justice system. No
specific instances of wrongful conduct by the named defendants were set forth in the prayer
for injunctive relief. The Court concluded that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not
in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief. . . if unaccompanied
by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. at 495-96. One reason posited by Justice
Rehnquist for going on to reach the merits in Rizzo was that in contrast to O'Shea, Rizzo did
not arise on the pleadings. 423 U.S. at 373.
37. 423 U.S. at 373-77. See note 47 and text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
38. 423 U.S. at 366.
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nary remedy,39 and the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to
the position that when federally protected rights are invaded, fed-
eral courts should adjust their remedies in order to grant the neces-
sary relief.4" Twice before Rizzo, in Hague v. CIO,' and, recently in
Allee v. Medrano,'2 the Supreme Court approved injunctive relief
against unconstitutional police practices. But while a federal court
may marshall its enforcement powers to order a police department
to desist from certain conduct found to violate the constitutional
rights of citizens, it is another matter for the court to intervene when
a lack of procedures is allegedly causing the denial of these rights
and order a police department to affirmatively act in order to rem-
edy a constitutional violation.
Although the Third Circuit was not alone in countenancing man-
39. The Supreme Court has stated:
[lilt is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts
to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain
individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to do.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (search and seizure). See also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (school desegregation); Lawrence Univ. Bicen.
Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (first amendment rights).
40. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
41. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, police officers were charged with conspiring to intimi-
date the petitioners in the exercise of their first amendment rights. In a plurality opinion,
Justice Stone stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 gave to every person the right to
maintain a suit in equity to restrain state officials acting under color of state law from
infringing rights guaranteed by the due process clause. Id. at 527.
42. 416 U.S. 802 (1974). In Allee, the Court considered whether enjoining police intimida-
tion designed to crush a nascent labor union was a proper exercise of a federal court's equita-
ble powers. The Court held that where there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct,
injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. at 815. Cf. note 75 infra. The dissent by three members of
the Rizzo majority termed this a "remarkable injunction." 416 U.S. at 846 (Burger, C.J.,
White & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring and dissenting). Expressing concern for the crowded
federal docket and overburdened appellate judges, Justice Burger said explicitly what Justice
Rehnquist intimated in Rizzo: "Federal district courts were not meant to be super-police
chiefs, disciplining individual law enforcement officers for infractions of the rules for arrests
and searches and seizures." Id. at 858. Cf. text accompanying note 63 infra.
Chief Justice Burger's expressed antipathy for federal court intervention in local law en-
forcement is troublesome in view of his prior recognition of the futility of other attempted
means of combatting unconstitutional conduct by the police. In an article written during his
tenure as circuit judge, he termed it "wishful thinking" to believe the suppression doctrine
deters unconstitutional police misconduct and called for other means of deterrence to keep
police conduct within the limits of the law. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM.
U.L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1964). See also Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX.
L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1974), observing that much of police policy is illegal or of doubtful
legality, yet police departments are largely exempt from judicial or administrative review.
Comments
datory injunctive relief to combat inadequate police supervision,"
the Supreme Court had never considered the propriety of such relief
before Rizzo. Rizzo could have been decided, then, by distinguish-
ing a prohibitory injunction, deemed appropriate in Hague and
Allee, from the imposition of an affirmative constitutional duty to
eliminate the misconduct of others. In terms of a constitutional
duty, the difference is a significant one."
The Supreme Court, however, did not limit its decision to this
distinction. Not only had three members of the Rizzo majority pre-
viously voiced displeasure with the prohibitory injunction in A Uee, 4.
but Rizzo's references to notions of federalism and comity seemed
intended to reduce the utility of section 1983 as a statute capable
of redressing constitutional wrongs. Rizzo's pronouncements on
standing" and the requisite direct participation in the actual depri-
vation of a right47 by themselves have the potential to reduce the
43. In Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 367 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
vacated, 424 U.S. 902, aff'g district court on remand, 534 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1976), the
petitioners alleged that supervisors have a duty to prevent police misconduct and to discipline
individual officers who engage in it. Overlooking this misconduct condoned and in effect
encouraged its continuation. Conceding that mandatory injunctions are extraordinary reme-
dies that must be issued with circumspection, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless held that if
the petitioners could prove their allegation, relief designed to force the administration to take
affirmative steps to prevent future violations might be appropriate. 520 F.2d at 7. The Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment and on remand for further consideration in light of Rizzo,
the suit was dismissed based on the standing requirements imposed by Rizzo and O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). See note 36 supra.
Litigation seeking to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional conduct by police departments has
proliferated in recent years, although most injunctive relief fashioned by the lower courts has
been of a prohibitory nature. See generally Note, Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief
Against Police Abuse: Picking Up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J.
530, 531 nn.8 & 9 (1976).
44. See notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 42 supra.
46. See note 36 supra.
47. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state
law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected" any other person to the deprivation of rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Act's legislative
history manifests Congress' intent to create a remedy when representatives of a state were
unwilling to enforce a state law, when to do so deprived persons of these rights. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961). Despite this recognition in Monroe, the thrust of Part B of
Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 373-77, is that, absent direct participation in the actual deprivation, there
can be no relief under 1983 against supervisory personnel. See notes 64-67 and accompany-
ing text infra for a fuller analysis of this portion of Rizzo.
Lower courts have disagreed about 1983 liability for perfunctory supervision which results
in violations of individual rights. Compare Padover v. Gimbels Bros. Inc., 412 F. Supp. 920,
922-23 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (absent allegations of wrongful conduct or even acquiescence, com-
1976
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amount of 1983 litigation entering federal court. More importantly,
Rizzo ostensibly expanded the scope of Younger-type abstention not
only to all civil cases, but also to situations where an individual
seeks relief from non-judicial state action.
B. Extending Younger v. Harris to Section 1983
An analysis of Rizzo's potential impact on future section 1983
litigation and federal-state relations must begin with the Supreme
Court decision in Younger v. Harris.45 Younger is most often cited
for the proposition that absent bad faith or harassment by state
officials, a federal court must defer to a state criminal proceeding
when a state statute or prosecution allegedly violates a constitu-
tional right." But in Younger the Court also identified an additional
doctrine to be used by federal courts in order to minimize federal-
plaint must be dismissed) and Beard v. Boren, 413 F. Supp. 41, 43 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (no
liability unless defendant "directly and personally participates") and Wilkerson v. Mock, 403
F. Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("[i]t is well settled that police supervisory personnel are
not liable in damages to a person injured by police misconduct absent direct personal partici-
pation"), with Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1297 (D.D.C. 1976) (failure to take
preventive measures rendered police chief liable under § 1983) and Morris v. Danna, 411 F.
Supp. 1300, 1302 n.5 (D. Minn. 1976) (failure to supervise may incur 1983 liability). Cf. Harris
v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding 1983 suit against warden since
indifference to inmate's injuries is tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment).
There is also a marked conflict among the lower courts whether supervisors could be liable
under the traditional tort doctrine of respondeat superior. Compare Sebastian v. United
States, 531 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1976) (respondeat superior has no application in a 1983 context)
and Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895 (D. Mass. 1976) (no vicari-
ous liability under this section) and Padover v. Gimbel Bros., supra, with Taylor v. Gibson,
529 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1976) ("assertions of insulation from liability because section 1983
does not permit derivative, respondeat superior, liability are questionable, and, at best,
overbroad") and Croy v. Skinner, 410 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (respondeat superior
applicable in action brought under § 1983). Cf. Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566, 572 (3d
Cir. 1974) (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (advocating supervisor's liability not on
theory of respondeat superior but due to acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct).
Rizzo seems to have settled this entire controversy. Its practical effect is that unless a
plaintiff can show by specific pleadings that a member of a school board, or a warden,
superintendent of corrections, or any other law enforcement official actively participated in
the alleged deprivation, the complaint would fail to state a claim and summary judgment
would lie. But see Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing Rizzo, noting
that § 1983 by its terms does not require "personal participation," and holding that the
"proper question" is whether the complaint adequately alleges the requisite causal connec-
tion between the supervisors' actions and the deprivation of the complainant's constitutional
rights).
48. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
49. See id. at 49-53.
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state conflict and promote federalism." This doctrine, generally
known as comity, is predicated on the belief that proper respect for
the competence of state legislation and judicial proceedings compels
a federal court to decline to adjudicate the federal rights of parties
involved in ongoing state proceedings. 5'
One year after its decision in Younger, Mitchum v. Foster"2 pre-
sented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to apply Younger's
notions of federalism and comity to civil as well as criminal proceed-
ings. Mitchum involved a challenge under section 1983 to a state
nuisance statute which had been applied to allegedly obscene mate-
rial sold by a bookstore. Rather than extend Younger, the Court
held that 1983 civil rights actions were exceptions to the federal
anti-injunction statute,53 remanded the case for further considera-
tion in that light, and avoided the question of Younger's effect on
civil proceedings.54
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,55 the applicability of Younger-style
comity to a 1983 claim in a civil suit, the question left unanswered
in Mitchum, was faced by the Court for the first time.- A sheriff
and prosecuting attorney initiated public proceedings against the
management of a theater showing pornographic films and the thea-
ter was ordered closed by the state court. Instead of appealing
through the state judicial system, the defendants appealed the offi-
50. In Younger, Justice Black defined "Our Federalism" as
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways.
401 U.S. at 44.
51. The Younger Court used the terms comity and federalism synonymously. See note 50
supra.
52. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
53. The anti-injunction statute states: A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1965). Section 2283 is not a doctrine of comity but an "absolute
ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against pending state court proceedings in the
absence of one of the recognized exceptions." 407 U.S. at 228-29.
54. The Court in Mitchum was careful to point out, however, that its decision was not
intended to emasculate the notions of comity and federalism enunciated in Younger. "[W]e
do not question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity and federalism that
must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 243.
55. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
56. Prior to Huffman the holding and rationale of Younger were thought to apply only to
criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
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cials' action to the federal district court, alleging a deprivation of
constitutional rights under section 1983. In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held that the non-intervention principles of
Younger applied, notwithstanding the existence of the 1983 claim
and the lack of a criminal proceeding.57 Yet Justice Rehnquist's
characterization of the state proceeding as "closely akin" to a crimi-
nal prosecution,58 along with his express refusal to make a general
pronouncement concerning the applicability of Younger to all civil
litigation,59 injected uncertainty into the scope of Huffman.," The
Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo seems to have resolved this un-
-certainty. In referring to Huffman without using any language limit-
ing its application to civil actions in the nature of criminal proceed-
ings, the Court held that principles of federalism espoused there and
in O'Shea v. Littleton"' may prevent a federal court from enjoining
any ongoing state civil proceeding." But Rizzo went beyond apply-
ing notions of federalism to state judicial proceedings:
We think these principles likewise have applicability where
injunctive relief is sought not against the judicial branch of the
state government, but against those in charge of an executive
branch of an agency of state or local governments such as res-
pondents [sic] here.6"
57. 420 U.S. at 594.
58. Id. at 604.
59. Id. at 607.
60. A number of circuit courts had extended the Younger-Huffman principles to civil
actions brought under § 1983. See, e.g., Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691, 693 (6th Cir. 1976)
(citing Huffman and Younger in refusing to enjoin state award in custody case); Williams v.
Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976) (application for declaratory and injunctive relief barred
by comity principles of Huffman and Younger when petitioner sought to enjoin adoption
decree consummated without giving him notice). But see Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1976) (doctrine of equitable restraint announced in
Huffman applies to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings). See generally Note, The New
Federal Comity: Pursuit of Younger Ideas in a Civil Context, 61 IowA L. REV. 784 (1976).
61. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). In O'Shea, the complainants alleged that the various defendants
were engaging in discriminatory practices in the administration of the criminal justice system
in Alexander County, Illinois. They filed suit in federal court under 1983 and sought injunc-
tive relief. In addition to dismissing the suit because the complaint failed to allege a constitu-
tional case or controversy, see note 36 supra, Justice White observed that
such a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the
daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of
equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted.
414 U.S. at 502.
62. 423 U.S. at 379-80.
63. Id. at 380.
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This language in Rizzo is susceptible of two interpretations. The
Supreme Court may simply have seen the district court injunction
as interfering with local government's ability to prevent misconduct
by subordinate officials, particularly where the named defendants
did not participate in the alleged wrong. 4 The Court's rejection of
the plaintiffs' reliance on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education,5 which upheld federal intervention in the administra-
tion of public schools when the named defendants actually partici-
pated in denying the petitioners equal protection, supports this in-
terpretation. If Rizzo is therefore limited to those instances where a
defendant is charged with not enforcing the Constitution, it may not
represent a major doctrinal change. The Constitution forbids the
beating, harassment, or intimidation of citizens by state officials,
but it may not compel police officials to create non-judicial proce-
dures to punish police officers for constitutional violations, or to
establish disciplinary schemes and implement them in good faith."
In terms of a constitutional duty, if this is the extent of the Rizzo
holding, it is legally tenable and arguably not inconsistent with
prior cases such as Allee.67
There is an alternative and more alarming interpretation of the
Court's opinion, however. The Constitution may very well impose
no duty to prevent others from participating in constitutional
wrongs, but arguably Rizzo's language does not stop there. It is
possible that in one broad sweep Younger's notions of federalism
64. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
65. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
66. Arguably, however, this misstates the constitutional issue. Perhaps it should be
stated: Do police officials have an absolute duty to prevent all constitutional wrongs by their
subordinates acting in the scope of their employment, or alternatively, do police officials have
a constitutional duty to use good faith efforts to halt known, repeated misconduct by officers?
This latter alternative shades into the acknowledged duty not to participate directly in the
alleged wrong, since indifference is in effect tacit encouragement and tacit encouragement is
the functional equivalent of direct participation. See, e.g., Delaney v. Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351,
1354 (D. Mass. 1976) (cognizable 1983 claim must allege participation or acquiescence in the
constitutional deprivation). These subtle nuances have left the lower courts in disarray. See
note 47 supra.
67. In Rizzo, Justice Rehnquist did acknowledge the difference between enjoining active
misconduct and imposing liability for a supervisor's failure to act:
The theory of liability . . . urged upon us by the respondents, is that even without
a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small percentage of the police
force, petitioners' failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern is indistinguishable
from the active conduct enjoined in Hague and Medrano.
423 U.S. at 375-76 (emphasis in original). He described the plaintiffs' view as an "amorphous
proposition" which "blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language." Id. at 376.
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and comity may have been made applicable to virtually any section
1983 action where the alleged wrongdoer derives his authority from
a non-judicial arm of the state. If the Supreme Court is saying that
a federal court should be hesitant to entertain a 1983 suit whenever
an individual alleges that a member of a school board, city planning
commission, prison administration or law enforcement agency is
acting in a way to deprive him of his constitutional rights, Rizzo
represents a significant undermining of 1983's utility as a statute
capable of vindicating those rights. Because of statutory interpreta-
tion, state agencies and commissions are already beyond the reach
of a 1983 damage suit." If notions of comity militate against enter-
taining any suit against individual members of those agencies, the
Civil Rights Act has lost much of its vitality as an effective weapon
against unconstitutional conduct consummated under color of state
law."
Assuming the Court is in fact expanding Younger and Huffman
to reach civil rights suits against non-judicial state proceedings, it
is troublesome that it did so without an adequate appraisal of the
underlying purposes of those cases and section 1983. Rizzo failed to
address the fact that the state interests which Younger and
Huffman sought to protect are not present in a situation where there
is no state litigation in progress and a party seeks relief from the
actions of a non-judicial arm of the government. Since the state is
not a party to any litigation, and no criminal or quasi-criminal
statute which the state desires to have enforced is involved, a state's
adjudicatory processes are not disturbed, nor is the integrity of the
state judiciary impugned by federal suits when there is no state
proceeding pending. In Huffman, the Court reiterated what had
been declared in Steffel v. Thompson:7" "the relevant principles of
equity, comity, and federalism have little force in the absence of a
pending state proceeding."' By expanding the rationale of Younger
and Huffman beyond the context of state judicial proceedings, in
68. See notes 184-96 and accompanying text infra.
69. Applying Younger principles to such suits would impose an additional burden on 1983
plaintiffs suing state officers; the Supreme Court has granted immunity in varying degree to
nearly all state officials, thus placing them beyond the reach of a 1983 damage action. See
notes 156-82 and accompanying text infra.
70. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
71. 420 U.S. at 602-03, citing 415 U.S. at 462. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
930 (1975), the Court held that the issuance of an injunction was not governed by Younger
where no state proceedings was in progress.
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less than one year federalism and comity have been elevated from
insignificant considerations when no state proceeding is disrupted
to precepts sufficiently compelling to preclude persons alleging une-
ven enforcement of the law72 from having their claims litigated in a
federal court. Consequently, civil libertarians fear the Rizzo deci-
sion represents decreased awareness by the Supreme Court of the
purpose of section 1983 which less than a decade ago it had charac-
terized as making federal courts the "primary and powerful reli-
ances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws,
and treaties of the United States. 73
C. The Impact of Rizzo
Whether Rizzo is read narrowly or broadly by the lower courts will
largely determine its impact on future section 1983 litigation in the
federal courts. Beyond insulating supervisory personnel from liabil-
ity under the Act for their failure to prevent others from violating
constitutional rights, the scope of the decision is unclear. The deci-
sion is based on alternative grounds7' which will undoubtedly pro-
vide flexibility to lower courts adjudicating future 1983 claims. Fur-
thermore, one recurrent theme throughout Rizzo was the fact the
Court discounted the gravity of the alleged violations and was not
convinced they would recur in the absence of injunctive relief.75
Under this analysis, despite Rizzo, a federal court may intervene
when the gravity of an alleged constitutional violation requires ex-
traordinary relief.
There are already indications of dissatisfaction with Rizzo's hold-
ing that a petitioner must show direct participation by the named
official to state a claim under section 1983,71 and its pronounce-
72. The evils of this type of law enforcement were recognized in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), in the context of a vague statute. See also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-85 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) (uneven and
illegal law enforcement breeds contempt for the law).
73. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (emphasis in original). Cf. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (stressing the "paramount role" Congress has assigned
to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights).
74. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
75. The Court was unconvinced the petitioner had established a pattern of unconstitu-
tional police practices as in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812 (1974). 423 U.S. at 374-75.
The fulcrum of Justice Blackmun's dissent was this conclusion of the majority. He noted the
district court's finding of a "persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights" coupled with
"official indifference." 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. In Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1976), the district court held that
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ments on federal abstention under the principles of federalism and
comity. Emphazing their constitutional and statutory duty to vindi-
cate federal rights, and that abstention is a narrow exception to this
obligation, especially in a civil rights context," lower courts have
refused to extend the principles of Younger and Huffman where
there is no ongoing state proceeding and a petitioner challenges
state action under section 1983.11 Because of the inherent broadness
of the concepts of comity and federalism, along with their discre-
tionary nature, the effect of Rizzo must ultimately await determina-
tion on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, the Court has indicated
to future litigants and the lower courts that section 1983 is no longer
a carte blanche for federal review of allegedly wrongful conduct
under color of state law.
II. Paul v. Davis: LIMITING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
To establish a cause of action under section 1983, a plaintiff must
failure to take preventive measures rendered a police chief liable under § 1983. The court
relied on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for its view that liability should attach
because supervision of police officers is not discretionary. This position directly contravenes
Rizzo. Supervisors in Philadelphia have a statutory duty to train, discipline, and supervise
patrolmen. PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER, ch. 2, at 5-200. Accord, Sims v. Adams, 537
F.2d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing Rizzo and determining that when a supervi-
sory defendant breaches a duty imposed by state law and this breach causes the plaintiffs
"constitutional injury," the requisite § 1983 claim is established). Cf. notes 66 & 67 and
accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1976) (challenging
state's failure to furnish treatment to those involuntarily confined to state institutions);
Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1976) (suit alleging state
intimidation and discrimination due to interracial marriage); Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp.
905, 907 (D.N.J. 1976) (challenging New Jersey's civil commitment procedures); Cicero v.
Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (challenging New York parole statute). Cf.
McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484, 489 (5th Cir. 1976) (problem of recurring constitutional
violations).
78. For example, in Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the defendants,
presumably relying on Rizzo, argued that the plaintiffs 1983 claim challenging the New York
parole statute would "needlessly thrust the federal courts into a particularly sensitive and
complex area of state regulation." Id. at 1087. The court flatly rejected the argument, empha-
sizing that absention is a narrow exception to the overriding principle that bona fide claims
brought under the Civil Rights Act can be heard by a federal court. Id. See also Goldy v. Beal,
Civil No. 75-791 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 1976) (1983 action to enjoin Pennsylvania's civil commit-
ment statute not barred by equitable restraint principles of Younger when no state proceeding
has begun). Cf. Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1976)
(doctrine of equitable restraint enunciated in Huffman inapplicable to 1983 action for dam-
ages since result would not annul state court proceeding).
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allege the infringement of a constitutional right secured by the four-
teenth amendment and that the right was deprived by a person
acting under color of state law.7" Violation of such a right gives rise
to a "constitutional tort." 0 Congress created the first constitutional
torts by enactment of a series of civil rights acts following ratifica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.8 ' Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now section 1983, was enacted to implement the four-
teenth amendment and provide an express federal remedy for its
violation."2
Whereas the language of section 1983 dictates that a cause of
action under the Civil Rights Act will lie only for deprivations of
constitutional rights, state action which contravenes the due process
clause does not automatically create a cause of action under section
1983. Neither is it clear whether conduct by a private citizen which
would give rise to a state tort action is cognizable in federal court
under section 1983 if a state official was involved. The Supreme
Court addressed these uncertainties in Paul v. Davis.3 As in Rizzo,
the decision is at least arguably consistent with prior case law. Yet
the Court resolved these questions in a manner which will poten-
tially restrict the future usefulness of section 1983.
A. State Tort Law vs. "General Federal Tort Law"
When examining Paul, it is important to keep in mind prior judi-
cial thought on the relationship between a constitutional tort and a
private wrong actionable under standard tort principles.8" In
79. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976).
80. Section 1983 has commonly been described as creating a "constitutional tort." See
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
277 (1965).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-94 (1970).
82. No such express remedy exists for violations of other constitutional rights. In Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), however,
the Supreme Court held that a violation of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures by a federal officer gave rise to a tort claim cognizable in federal court.
See Comment, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counselling Hesitation,"
9 IND. L. REV. 441 (1976), discussing the right to sue federal officers for tort damages under a
Bivens theory along with the countervailing considerations.
83. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
84. A private tort merely requires a plaintiff to have a legally protected right which, when
invaded by the defendant, is compensable by money damages. W. PRossa, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 4 (4th ed. 1971). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 1.1 (1973). Neither Monroe nor subsequent Supreme Court cases have been
instructive in delineating the differences, if any, between a "constitutional tort" and a private
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Monroe v. Pape, 85 Justice Douglas stated that section 1983 was to
be "read against the background of tort liability" in determining
whether a constitutional right had been violated. The impact of
Justice Douglas' statement has been considerable."7 While he may
have been suggesting the development of a federal common law of
torts for use in 1983 cases,8" it seems clear that Justice Douglas was
not suggesting that the same conduct actionable as a common law
tort in state court was necessarily actionable in federal court under
section 1983.89 Yet some federal courts, interpreting this dictum
literally, have made various tort concepts determinative of 1983
liability."° Others seemed to assume that if the prima facie elements
of a state tort were established, a 1983 claim would arise if the
conduct was under color of state law.' Another interpretation of
Douglas' language, however, is that once it is determined a violation
of a constitutional right has occurred, then the "background of tort
liability" becomes a referent in fashioning the proper relief or proof
of the deprivation. 2 It was this interpretation which was implicitly
adopted in Paul when the Supreme Court declared that neither 1983
tort. In Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972), the Third Circuit distinguished the
two in terms of a public/private dichotomy. Judge Aldisert noted that whereas tort law
protects private rights, the "rights protected by § 1983 are public ones, created or adopted
by the Federal Constitution or by Congress." Id. at 279. See Dorak v. Shapp, 403 F. Supp.
863, 866 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (distinguishing the two torts on similar grounds).
85. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
86. Id. at 187.
87. For a thorough discussion of the implications of this statement by Justice Douglas see
Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nahmod].
88. See id. at 9.
89. In a concurring opinion in Monroe, Justice Harlan noted that violation of a constitu-
tional right is more serious than violation of a state right. 365 U.S. at 196 & n.5. In construing
1983's criminal counterpart, now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), Justice Douglas has observed that
"[v]iolation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded."
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945).
Only a few lower courts have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nichols, 409 F. Supp.
927, 933 (D. Kan. 1976) (although § 1983 confers a right of action "sounding in tort," not all
violations of state law rise to the level of a constitutional tort). See also note 103 infra.
90. See Nahmod, supra note 87, at 23-28 & nn. 81-94 and cases cited therein.
91. E.g., Weisman v. Lelandais, 532 F.2d 308, 311 (2d Cir. 1976) (since prima facie ele-
ments of false imprisonment appear when police officer makes arrest, 1983 cause of action
made out); Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (an alleged assault by
law enforcement officers is a claim cognizable under § 1983).
92. See Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1972) (petitioner using § 1983 must
first establish right, then use background of tort law to establish proof of the deprivation).
Cf. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1976) (school desegrega-
tion suit applying Monroe's mandate to read 1983 against the background of tort liability).
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nor the fourteenth amendment creates a body of federal tort law to
be vindicated in federal court."3
The plaintiff in Paul was arrested for shoplifting and pleaded not
guilty at his arraignment. Before the charges were dropped, the
defendants, two chiefs-of-police, circulated a flyer to nearly 800
merchants in the surrounding area, complete with photographs,
which described the plaintiff as an "active shoplifter."94 The plain-
tiff's claim for damages under section 1983, and his request for
declaratory and injunctive relief, were predicated on a violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; he alleged a
deprivation of liberty since the stigma imposed by the officials'
action would, among other things, impair his future employment
opportunities. Justice Rehnquist conceded that the plaintiff had
made out a claim for defamation actionable in state court. But the
due process clause was not a "font of tort law" to be superimposed
on the entire body of tort law administered by the state courts; every
violation by a state officer of one of the procedural guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment does not give rise to a constitutional tort. 5
In addition, the Court rejected any implication that the due pro-
cess clause creates a cause of action under 1983 whenever the state
can be characterized as the tort-feasor; conduct cognizable as a
state tort was not a fortiori actionable in federal court when a state
official was involved." The Court in Paul has therefore refused to
construe 1983 to include all tortious conduct committed by state
officials merely because their acts might give rise to a state claim.97
Turning specifically to the plaintiff's claim, the Court reasoned
93. 424 U.S. at 699-701.
94. Id. at 695.
95. Id. at 701.
96. Justice Rehnquist observed:
Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally
cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under "color
of law" establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come
as a great surprise to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amend-
ment to learn that it worked such a result ....
Id. at 699.
97. In a stinging dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized that the existence of a state remedy
is irrelevant in deciding whether a cause of action will lie under § 1983. He argued that the
fourteenth amendment "clearly renders unconstitutional actions taken by state officials that
would merely be tortious conduct if engaged in by those acting in their private capacities."
Id. at 716. In his view, arbitrary and capricious government conduct which infringed on a
person's dignity and sense of good worth was precisely the kind of evil the due process clause
was intended to eradicate. Id. at 735.
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that since the stigma to his reputation was the only injury alleged,
and no specific guarantee in the fourteenth amendment protected
that interest, to be actionable the right asserted must fall within the
amendment's protection of the substantive aspects of liberty." Be-
cause the right to one's reputation was deemed neither "fundamen-
tal" nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," the right as-
serted by the plaintiff was not secured by the fourteenth
amendment and therefore was not actionable under section 1983.11
The defendants had not committed a constitutional tort.
In the wake of Paul, a civil rights claim against state officials
alleging, for example, an unreasonable search and seizure, could be
brought under section 1983, since the right to be free from such
conduct is expressly granted by the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 00 Also, a state official who interferes with an individual's
right to vote is still amenable to a 1983 suit since the right to vote
has been deemed a fundamental right.'0 ' Beyond these circum-
stances, however, the Court's standard provides little guidance for
determining what conduct renders a state official answerable to a
civil rights suit.10 In the future, courts must determine when con-
duct under color of state law goes beyond the pale of "ordered lib-
erty," thus giving rise to a cause of action under section 1983.'10 The
98. Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (fourteenth amendment protects
substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restriction by the state).
99. 424 U.S. at 712-14.
100. The Court in Paul distinguished Monroe on precisely this basis. Justice Rehnquist
declared that the complaint in Monroe stated a cause of action under the fourteenth amend-
ment because it alleged an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 700-01.
101. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating poll tax
as prerequisite to voting). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to inter-
state travel fundamental). In recent years the Court has shown a reluctance to expand the
number of recognized fundamental rights. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (decent housing);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare payments).
102. It has been recognized that one function of the Court, in addition to resolving the
instant controversy for the litigants, is to articulate guiding principles to assist the lower
courts in the adjudication of future cases. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 37 (1957), criticizing the
Court's decision in Lincoln Mills for failing to outline the sources and guides to which federal
judges will turn in fashioning a federal common law of labor as directed by the Court.
103. Until the Supreme Court articulates its position on this subject, Judge Friendly's oft-
cited opinion in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), may provide some guidance
as to when conduct under color of state law gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983. In
his view, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which involved conduct which "shocked
the conscience," points the way in determining whether the constitutional line has been
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probable effect of Paul will be to limit 1983 suits to instances of out-
rageous conduct or actions which offend notions of common de-
cency. 0 14 The Supreme Court seems to be saying that 1983 claims
alleging only simple assault by a policeman, confiscation of personal
property by a prison warden, or false arrest by a law enforcement
official are no longer proper subjects for federal adjudication. 5 Ap-
parently, the fear expressed by some lower courts, that bringing to
the federal forum suits previously taken to state courts under stan-
dard tort and property principles would trivialize the Constitu-
tion, 10 has resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in Paul.
Concern over the debasement of the Federal Constitution may
have been appropriate in certain circumstances. Certainly it can be
argued that the Constitution is not the proper vehicle for providing
redress each time a state officer places a private citizen in fear of
bodily harm or offensively touches an individual while acting in the
scope of his employment. When an individual claims that his good
name, reputation, and personal integrity are being seriously dam-
aged by irresponsible conduct of state officials, however, the argu-
ment for constitutional protection would seem to be a tenable one.
To recognize reputation as a constitutionally protected right pre-
sented the Supreme Court with the difficult problem of reconciling
well established principles of statutory construction and constitu-
crossed. He would not require that an individual be able to point to a "specific" guarantee
in the Bill of Rights before demonstrating a deprivation of liberty without due process of law;
in Johnson, which involved police brutality, the application of undue force would suffice. 481
F.2d at 1032. In Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972), the Third Circuit observed
that all torts do not rise to the level of constitutional violations, holding that where conduct
goes beyond decency a 1983 cause of action will lie. Id. at 282. Cf. Meredith v. Arizona, 523
F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding 1983 suit where conduct was "offensive to human
dignity").
104. See note 103 supra. But see McCormack, supra note 7, at 7-8, arguing that limiting
1983 causes of action to "outrageous abuses" would not adequately protect individual rights.
105. Lower court opinions which have upheld 1983 actions under similar circumstances
are now of questionable vitality. See, e.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975)
(1983 action will lie for conversion of prisoner's radio); Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F. Supp. 187
(M.D.N.C. 1976) (alleged assault is a cognizable claim under § 1983 where state officer
involved); Bur v. Gilbert, 415 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (post-Paul case holding that
element of excessive or unnecessary force not a prerequisite to recovery under § 1983 in suit
for unlawful arrest). See also Weisman v. Lelandais, 532 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1976) (simple false
imprisonment); Watters v. Parrish, 402 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Va. 1975) (upholding 1983 claim
when towing plaintiff's car allegedly violated due process).
106. E.g., Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 1975)




tional adjudication, brought into conflict by the constitutional
claim in Paul v. Davis.
B. Reputation as a Constitutional "Liberty"Interest: Reconciling
1983 and Principles of Incorporation
Some redress must be available for intentional or reckless false-
hoods published by state officials which injure private citizens. The
real question presented in Paul was whether state or federal courts
should provide the redress. It is true, as Justice Brennan's dissent
in Paul points out, that the existence of an adequate state remedy
has heretofore been irrelevant in determining whether there is a
cause of action under section 1983.107 The problem involved in Paul
was how to reconcile this principle with the equally well established
principle that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause incor-
porated' 8 only those fundamental rights in need of constitutional
protection because of a state's failure to safeguard that right.' 9
One reason the Court rejected the plaintiff's constitutional claim
was that no express guarantee in the Bill of Rights secured the right
to one's good reputation. 0 Neither is there an express constitutional
right to have illegally seized evidence excluded from an accused's
trial. Yet, in Mapp v. Ohio,"' the Supreme Court incorporated the
exclusionary rule into the fourteenth amendment when it realized
that other means were not deterring state law enforcement officials
from disregarding the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures. 1 2 Arguably, the right asserted by the
107. See 424 U.S. at 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein.
108. See note 27 supra.
109. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3046-47 (1976), describing the exclusionary rule
as a judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the fourth amendment,
and discussing its incorporation into the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), based on the belief it would deter unlawful police misconduct. In Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), the right to be free from arbitrary intrusions by police officers was
recognized as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and therefore a proper subject for
incorporation. Despite this recognition, the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
the states since it was not "an essential ingredient of that right." 338 U.S. at 29. But see note
112 and accompanying text infra.
110. 424 U.S. at 701.
111. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
112. Id. at 652-53, 656-58. The Supreme Court in Mapp found "not controlling" the
factual considerations which prompted the Court to refuse to extend the exclusionary rule to
the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See note 109 supra. One of the principle
reasons for overruling Wolf was "[tihe obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment
to the protection of other remedies." 367 U.S. at 652.
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plaintiff in Paul could have been incorporated into the due process
clause as a violation of the constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy, despite the fact the Bill of Rights does not explicitly protect
that right."3 However, while the states did not vigorously or effec-
tively protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, they
have not been lax in protecting the right to reputation. Indeed,
federal courts have had to intervene when overzealous state courts,
in an effort to redress violations of this right, have impermissibly cut
into the protection afforded free speech by the first amendment."'
In view of the stringency with which the states have safeguarded
reputation, the Court's reluctance to declare a new federal right and
give reputation constitutional protection may be defensible, despite
Monroe's recognition that the adequacy of state remedies is irrele-
vant to section 1983 litigation. The Supreme Court in Paul did not
address the relationship between state and federal enforcement of
this right. Instead, the Court decided Paul by distinguishing past
decisions which had seemed to give constitutional protection to rep-
utation in the form of notice and an opportunity to clear one's name.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau 5 presented the Supreme Court with
a formidable hurdle if it were to decide Paul without overruling any
of its prior decisions. A chief of police, pursuant to a state statute,
had posted a notice in area liquor stores forbidding all sales of liquor
to the plaintiff for one year. In holding that due process is denied
when a state attaches such a "badge of infamy" to an individual
without prior notice or a hearing, Justice Douglas observed:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential."'
113. The plaintiff in Paul alleged a violation of his right of privacy guaranteed by the first,
fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. 424 U.S. at 712. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973) (recognizing that "zones of privacy" may be created by more specific
constitutional guarantees). Justice Rehnquist found the plaintiffs claim "far afield" from
Supreme Court decisions recognizing a constitutional right of privacy. 424 U.S. at 713.
114. The classic case delineating the conflict between the first amendment protection of
free speech and a private cause of action for defamation is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally Warnock, The New York Times Rule-The Awakening
Giant of First Amendment Protections, 62 KY. L.J. 824 (1974).
115. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
116. Id. at 437. See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,898 (1961) (discharge
of government contractor employee); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (badge
of infamy may arise if branded disloyal by government).
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More recently, in Goss v. Lopez, "' the Court held that the guaran-
tees of the fourteenth amendment must accompany a suspension
from school since charges of misconduct could seriously damage a
student's reputation."8 Distinguishing these cases, Justice Rehn-
quist framed the issue in Paul as whether due process guarantees
were brought into play when a government official defames an indi-
vidual without affecting any other right initially recognized and
protected by state law. The Court held they were not, although
language in Constantineau "could be taken to mean" that if a gov-
ernment official defames a person, without more, the procedural
requirements of the due process clause come into play."' Constan-
tineau, Goss, and earlier decisions dealing with government em-
ployment' may be distinguishable from Paul. In each case, as a
result of state action, a right or status previously recognized or
protected by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished.,
This threshold element was missing in Paul. In the Court's view,
this distinction was significant enough to deny the plaintiff in Paul
the same procedural protections granted others whose reputation
had been injured by defamatory publications of officials acting
under state law. 22
To dispose of the reputation question in Paul, the Court could
have simply overruled Monroe and held that when a state remedy
is adequate in both practice and theory-generally the case with
defamation-a plaintiff must seek relief in state court. Instead of
this drastic measure, the Court reached the same result through
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), Justice Stewart, who joined the majority in Paul,
called one's reputation interest "a concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being." While noting that its protection is left largely to the states, he stated that the interest
was entitled to no less protection in federal court. Id. at 92 (concurring opinion).
117. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted in 14 DUQ. L. REv. 295 (1976).
118. Id. at 574-75.
119. 424 U.S. at 708.
120. See note 116 supra.
121. An adult has a right under state law to purchase alcohol along with the rest of the
citizenry, and state law confers upon every child the right to attend school. An employee also
has a right to continued employment when he can establish the requisite entitlement. Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03
(1972). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (since individuals have right to operate
motor vehicles on state highways, state must afford individual due process before revoking
his driver's license).
122. 424 U.S. at 710-11. The thrust of Paul is that a person's status is "altered" when the
state suspends him from school, terminates his employment with the state, or denies him the
right to purchase alcohol, but it is not altered when the state labels an innocent person as an
active shoplifter. Compare 424 U.S. at 710-14, with id. at 734-36. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Cf. note 123 infra.
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strained reasoning'23 and created the impression that the Court is
uninterested in cases where state officials recklessly denigrate pri-
vate individuals. More importantly, Paul has made it clear that
neither the Constitution nor section 1983 protects an individual's
good name and reputation, even where they may have been seri-
ously damaged by persons acting under color of state law. The deci-
sion also determined that conduct which would give rise to a state
tort claim may not create a cause of action under section 1983 when-
ever the state can be characterized as the tort-feasor. While the
first of these restrictions represents a more limited restraint on the
use of section 1983, the Court's pronouncements on the scope of a
constitutional tort, and its limiting interpretation of the breadth of
the due process clause, may significantly :reduce the vitality of the
Civil Rights Act's original purpose: to deter wrongful state conduct
and compensate injured parties in the process.
III. Bishop v. Wood: DETERMINING PROPERTY INTERESTS SOLELY BY
REFERENCE TO STATE LAW
The fourteenth amendment and section 1983 protect not only
liberty interests but also property interests from deprivation with-
out due process of law. In Paul, the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's purported liberty interest as neither fundamental nor
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so as to fall within the
scope of substantive due process. In the course of that decision the
Court observed that the due process clause was not in itself a source
of protectible liberty interests to be embodied in general federal tort
law. 24 Three months after Paul, in Bishop v. Wood, 2 1 the Supreme
Court turned its attention to the source and scope of property inter-
ests secured by the fourteenth amendment and section 1983. More
specifically, the Court reconsidered the scope of the protection af-
123. What follows from the Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is a
number of curious results. First, an individual's privilege to purchase alcohol, at least in a
context such as Constantineau, is accorded constitutional protection, while his right to his
personal integrity and good name is not. Second, by distinguishing Constantineau and Goss
on the ground that defamation implicates no right "recognized or protected" by state law,
what follows is the proposition that state law does not "protect" this right even though it
provides a forum for the legal redress of its infringement by means of a damage action. See
424 U.S. at 711-12.
124. 424 U.S. at 699-701.
125. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
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forded public employment by the due process clause.'26
Prior to Bishop, it was generally thought that state law was only
one source of protectible interests contemplated within the due pro-
cess clause.'2 7 In Board of Regents v. Roth, '1 the Court had observed
that property interests are understandings that support claims of
entitlement to certain benefits-understandings that emanate from
an "independent source such as state law.' ' 21 That definition
seemed to imply that property interests could also stem from other
sources, presumably giving a federal dimension to a term appearing
in the Constitution.10 In a 5-4 decision, however, the Court in
Bishop held that an individual's claim of entitlement to a property
interest secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment must be determined solely by reference to state law.'3 ' With
the admonition that "the federal court is not the appropriate forum
in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are
made daily by public agencies,' 3 2 the Court ruled that a policeman
126. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 63 (3d Cir. 1976) (analyzing the import
of Bishop).
127. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also notes 128-30 and accom-
panying text infra.
128. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
129. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
130. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (1976) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting);
id. at 2085 (White, J., dissenting) (adequacy of due process procedures should be determined
by federal and not state law once state confers a property right). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (adequacy of statutory procedures
for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional
terms). In the area of federal taxation, it is well established that federal authorities are not
bound by a state court determination of a property interest. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1967) (for purposes of federal estate tax liability, state deter-
mination of property interest entitled to "proper regard," not finality).
131. 96 S. Ct. at 2077-78 & n.7 (1976).
132. Id. at 2080. Whether this statement represents an extension of the concerns of feder-
alism and comity articulated in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) is unclear. Compare notes
32-73 and accompanying text supra, with text accompanying notes 148-51 infra. At least in
the delicate area of personnel relationships, the Court is willing to leave control in the hands
of the states. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the companion case to Roth, the
Supreme Court ruled that an understanding between faculty and teacher, so-called de facto
tenure, could be sufficient to trigger the due process clause upon the teacher's discharge. Id.
at 602-03. Chief Justice Burger advocated abstention where the question of whether an indi-
vidual had a property right was unclear under state law. Id. at 603-04 (concurring opinion).
Bishop may represent an extension of that view to all state personnel decisions involving
anything less than a written employment contract, tenure, or similar guarantee of continued
employment. As to Sindermann's recognition that such an interest is cognizable in federal
court, arguably, a plaintiff must now first go to state court for a determination of whether he
has a property interest which could not be extinguished without some due process procedures.
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fired without a hearing was not deprived of any constitutional right
since his termination implicated neither "property" nor "liberty"
interests' 3 within the meaning of the due process clause.
Addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the Court conceded
that a constitutionally protected property interest can be created by
ordinance or implied contract. 3  Yet, despite its observation that
the plaintiff was a permanent employee, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the lower court's construction of the city ordinance in
After Bishop, cases holding that a teacher with neither contractual nor implied tenure has
no property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment are still authoritative. See, e.g.,
Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976) (nonten-
ured school teacher has no property or liberty interest in renewal of his contract); Russell v.
El Paso Indep. School Dist., 539 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation of reemployment and citing Bishop as foreclosing further inquiry into
the merits of the claim).
133. In Part II of the Bishop opinion, the Court addressed the plaintiffs claim that he
had been deprived of a constitutional liberty interest under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972), because of the stigma which accompanied his discharge. 96 S. Ct. at 2079-
80. The Court held that something more than a potential stigma must accompany the em-
ployee's termination.
When the Supreme Court declared in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), that, standing
alone, defamation of an individual by a state official is not sufficient to establish a claim
under § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment, it preserved Roth and strongly intimated that
where the defamation or stigma accompanied the termination of the individual's employ-
ment, a 1983 action would lie in federal court. Id. at 710. In Bishop, however, the Court
qualified that position by adding that there must be public disclosure of the reasons for the
discharge in order to constitute a deprivation of liberty protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. 96 S. Ct. at 2079. Apparently, an individual's interest in his reputation, honor and
integrity is impaired only if the reasons for his dismissal become public knowledge.
This view is assailable as an overly restrictive view of the parameters of "liberty"
contemplated in the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Brennan pointed out, common sense
dictates that when a discharged employee seeks reemployment, the prospective employer will
inquire why the individual was terminated from his former employer's service. 96 S. Ct. at
2081 n.2 (dissenting opinion). Therefore, if the petitioner seeks further employment the rea-
sons for his dismissal will become widely known. It is the stigma to the individual, and the
reduced sense of worth, that arguably is the liberty interest. Regardless of the number of
persons who become aware of the reasons for the discharge, when a dismissal involves the
imputation of reprehensible, illegal, or other opprobrious conduct which impugns an individ-
ual's integrity, due process should come into play. Lower court decisions both before and after
Paul have focused on the individual injury rather than external factors. E.g., Connealy v.
Walsh, 412 F. Supp. 146, 159 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (charges creating the stigma must be graver
than mere charges of improper or inadequate job performance); Osmer v. Moiles, 409 F. Supp.
675, 676-77 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (relying on Sixth Circuit's decision in Paul and declaring that
charges which contain great potential for stigmatization trigger due process). See also Turano
v. Board of Educ., 411 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the liberty interest in
being free from stigmatization).
134. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (lack of tenure alone does not
negate fourteenth amendment claim). See note 132 supra.
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question'35 giving the plaintiff no property interest in continued
employment. Although the ordinance seemed to permit the dis-
charge of city employees only for cause,' 31 the Court acquiesced in
the conclusion that the plaintiff held his position at the "will and
pleasure of the city."'3 7 This interpretation was "tenable" and de-
rived "some support" from a decision of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court;' the Court felt it was therefore foreclosed from an
independent examination of the state law issue and dismissed the
suit. '31
Irrespective of the soundness of the view that only state law is
dispositive of the sufficiency of a claim of entitlement to a property
interest, Bishop represents a narrowing of Roth's pronouncements
on the scope of property interests secured by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court ignored its observation in Roth that the purpose
of the institution of property was to "protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined."'' 0
The plaintiff in Bishop was classified as a permanent employee
and Justice Stevens conceded that on its face the ordinance in ques-
tion "may fairly be read" as granting a guarantee of continued
employment.' Despite the fact this ordinance had never been con-
strued regarding the existence of such a guarantee, the Court de-
cided the plaintiff had no property interest secured by the four-
teenth amendment without considering whether he could have rea-
sonably relied on continued employment if he adequately performed
his duties. Under Roth, the relevant inquiry is whether it was objec-
tively reasonable for the employee to believe he could rely on contin-
ued employment;' in Bishop, the petitioner's reclassification as a
permanent employee after the requisite six month probationary pe-
riod, along with a reasonable reading of the local ordinance, should
have led to the conclusion that the petitioner could only be dis-
135. 377 F. Supp. 501, 503-05 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
136. See Justice White's dissenting opinion, 96 S. Ct. at 2083, for the relevant text of the
ordinance.
137. See 96 S. Ct. at 2078 & n.9, quoting 377 F. Supp. at 504.
138. See Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971) (enforceable expectation of
continued employment exists only if employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted
some form of guarantee).
139. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
140. 408 U.S. at 577.
141. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
142. See 408 U.S. at 577; cf. 96 S. Ct. at 2082 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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charged for cause after a due process hearing. When Justice Bren-
nan suggested a number of criteria' to determine whether an em-
ployee's reliance on continued employment was objectively reasona-
ble and therefore protectible as a property interest, Justice Stevens
termed his view a "remarkably innovative suggestion that we de-
velop a federal common law of property rights."'' Thus, the defini-
tion of property for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment is
simply what the states decide is property.' Carried to its logical
extreme, this proposition means that any state statute which
seemed to confer an entitlement to a property right can be construed
by a state court as not conferring such a right; if that construction
is "tenable,"' 46 then no constitutional right is implicated, no suit
under section 1983 will lie in federal court, and any challenge to the
discharge must be pursued in state court. "I
There was more at stake in Bishop than determining whether
North Carolina's classification of the petitioner as a permanent
employee afforded him a constitutional property right. Nothing in
the Constitution requires a state to reclassify its employees depend-
ing on the duration of their employment. Whatever North
Carolina's reason for this classification, it is doubtful its purpose
was to extend constitutional protection to the petitioner's interest
in continued employment; its reasons were probably peculiar to the
administration of its own law enforcement. What actually con-
cerned the Court was briefly referred to by Justice Stevens in
143. 96 S. Ct. at 2082 & n.5 (dissenting opinion).
144. Id. at 2080 n.14.
145. See McCormack, supra note 7, at 3 & n.12.
146. Compare this standard of review with Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), a suit
brought under § 1983, where the Court held a police force's hair-length regulation did not
infringe on any rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist stated
that in positing a constitutional challenge to a regulation which arguably infringes on an
individual's liberty interest in matters of personal appearance, the question is not whether
the state can establish a "genuine public need" for the regulation, but whether the complain-
ant can demonstrate there is "no rational connection between the regulation . . . and the
promotion of safety of persons and property." Id. at 247. Thus, in both Bishop and Kelley,
the Supreme Court has elected to narrow its scope of review in cases involving state public
employees despite the nature of the interest allegedly affected by the state action. See Ahearn
v. DiGrazia, 412 F. Supp. 638 (D. Mass. 1976) (dismissing 1983 suit after applying Kelley's
rational basis standard in an equal protection case which involved statutorily imposed pun-
ishment duty); But cf. Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1976)
(post-Kelley case upholding 1983 suit because state regulation of hair length could constitute
an invasion of constitutionally protected "liberty").
147. See 96 S. Ct. at 2080 n.13.
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Bishop,4 ' but fully articulated in National League of Cities v.
Usery.49 In the concluding segment of a plurality opinion Justice
Rehnquist observed that Congress may not exercise its power under
the commerce clause to force upon the states its methods of regulat-
ing integral government functions. 5 ' Providing police protection,
the function involved in Bishop, is a government service tradition-
ally left to the states and their subdivisions. Whereas notions of
federalism and comity counsel against federal court interference
with state judicial processes, concern for "the essentials of state
sovereignty"'' militate against federal interference into the admin-
istration of non-judicial government functions.
The import of Bishop then, like Rizzo and Paul, is that the Su-
preme Court is willing to allow the states to adjudicate at least some
allegedly wrongful conduct by certain individuals acting under the
color of state law. By declaring in Bishop that the validity of the
petitioner's potential state law claim was unaffected by its analysis
of the constitutional question,5 2 the Supreme Court implicitly ac-
knowledged that although action under color of state law should
give rise to a private cause of action for damages, section 1983 may
not always be the appropriate vehicle for redress.
Perhaps a federal court is not the appropriate forum to scrutinize
the entire spectrum of personnel decisions that are made daily by
public agencies. As the Supreme Court recently recognized in Elrod
v. Burns, '5 however, a person entering public employment is not
divested of all constitutional protection. Federal rights may be lost
148. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
149. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In Usery, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its
powers under the commerce clause in amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to extend the
Act's coverage to nearly all employees of the states and their subdivisions. In declaring the
amendments unconstitutional, the Court expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968), which had sustained the validity of earlier amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act extending its coverage to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.
150. 96 S. Ct. at 2474-76.
151. Id. at 2476, citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
152. 96 S. Ct. at 2080 n.13.
153. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976). In Elrod, non-civil-service employees of Cook County, Illinois
were discharged or threatened with discharge for not being affiliated with the Democratic
Party. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 for violation of rights
secured by the first and fourteenth amendments. In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan held
that patronage dismissals severely restrict freedom of association and political belief, and a
government may not force a public employee to relinquish his right to political association
as a price for holding a public job without impermissibly inhibiting his first amendment
rights. Id. at 2681-83.
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in the absence of expeditious federal adjudication,'54 and federal
courts are the appropriate forums to ensure that individuals are
accorded procedural safeguards when government action deprives
them of important property or liberty interests. In holding that the
petitioner's termination did not trigger the strictures of due process,
Bishop seems to represent the curtailment of constitutional safe-
guards which perhaps "marks too many recent decisions of the
Court."'
IV. Imbler v. Pachtman: PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY-ADDING TO THE
LIST OF THOSE BEYOND THE REACH OF SECTION 1983
The Supreme Court has consistently held that public officials are
entitled to some measure of immunity from damage actions'
brought under section 1983."1 To promote effective public adminis-
tration, the Court has engrafted common law immunities onto the
Act, despite the fact the statute creates a species of tort liability
which on its face admits of no immunities. 5 8 The granting of abso-
lute and qualified immunities represents an accommodation of in-
terests: public officials who labor under the onus of potential dam-
age actions may become hesitant in carrying out their responsibili-
154. See Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D.N.J. 1976) (challenging New Jersey's
civil commitment procedures).
155. 96 S. Ct. at 2082 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
156. Official immunity from damages under § 1983 does not necessarily mean a plaintiff
is left without relief. Although the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the issue, it
has indicated that official immunity will not bar equitable relief. See Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 314-15 n.6 (1975). A number of lower court opinions support this view. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1975) (policy considerations supporting official
immunity inapposite in the context of equitable relief); Taliaferro v. Willett, 411 F. Supp.
595 (E.D. Va. 1976) (individuals may be sued in their official capacity where declaratory relief
is sought); Demkowicz v. Endry, 411 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (1983 defense of good
faith and reasonable belief not available to school officials in suit for back pay which sounds
in equity).
157. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified, good faith immunity for school
officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for executive and
administrative officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity for judges;
qualified, good faith immunity for policemen); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(absolute immunity for legislators). See generally The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 219-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1974 Term]; McCormack,
supra note 7, at 10-17.
158. Justice Douglas has argued that the statute should be applied as stringently as it




ties and others will be deterred from entering public service.' 9 Also,
it would seem unjust for officials to be amenable to damage awards
as a consequence of honest, good faith mistakes. Yet a grant of
absolute immunity arguably conflicts with the policies underlying
section 1983-compensation for the deprivation of constitutional
rights and deterrence of future violations.'6
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,' ' the Supreme Court attempted to recon-
cile these conflicting interests by applying what was essentially a
"reasonable man" test of standard tort law for determinations of
immunity under section 1983. Scheuer held that state executive and
administrative officials were not entitled to immunity if, in light of
all the circumstances, their conduct was unreasonable.' 2 The Court
continued the trend in Wood v. Strickland,'6 3 holding that school
officials cannot claim immunity if they knew or reasonably should
have known their actions would violate a student's clearly estab-
lished constitutional rights.' Wood acknowledged that a greater
than average awareness of the law can be imputed to a person who
holds a public office demanding a high degree of intelligence and
judgment.' 5
In light of these developments, it was somewhat surprising that
in Imbler v. Pachtman I the Court held that a prosecuting attorney,
acting within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a
criminal prosecution, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for
damages under section 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's
constitutional rights."7 Examining the immunity historically ac-
159. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 157, at 220.
160. See id.; Nahmod, supra note 87, at 10-11.
161. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
162. Id. at 247-48.
163. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
164. Id. at 321-22. See Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (school
officials cannot claim § 1983 immunity when they violate well settled rights of students).
165. 420 U.S. at 322.
166. 424 U.S. 409 (1976), af'g 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit had
adhered to the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity for a number of years. See 500 F.2d at 1302
and cases cited therein. The court distinguished Scheuer on the basis that prosecutorial
immunity was a form of judicial immunity rather than executive immunity. Id. at 1304 n.4.
167. 424 U.S. at 430-31. The Court expressly deferred answering the question whether an
absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor carrying out his administrative or investigatory
functions. Id. See Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 n.5 (D. Minn. 1976) (post-
Imbler case suggesting issue of extending prosecutor's immunity be pursued in state court);
Gockley v. VanHoove, 409 F. Supp. 645, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (immunity extends to acts within
prosecutor's jurisdiction, but not to acts clearly outside that jurisdicction); Tomko v. Lees,
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corded prosecutors at common law, which Justice Powell found to
be absolute,' the Court concluded that the same policy considera-
tions determinative of prosecutorial immunity at common law ap-
plied under section 1983.11
Whereas the lower court decisions before Imbler struggled with
both the scope of prosecutorial immunity'70 and its derivation, 7
Imbler resolved the question and its rationale is now being applied
in other contexts. Absolute immunity from 1983 damage suits has
since been granted to parole and probation officers,' election offi-
cials, "'73 common pleas chief probation officers,' court-appointed
lawyers,'75 and possibly to public defenders;' federal prosecutors
have similarly been accorded immunity based on the policy consid-
erations underlying Imbler.77
416 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (refusing to extend immunity to prosecutor's actions
connected with recruiting and cultivating informants); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 412 F. Supp.
910, 913-14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (prosecutor, in his status as employer, not immune from 1983
suit). Cf. Wiggins v. Hess, 531 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing instances when judge can
lose his shield of immunity).
168. 424 U.S. at 421-24.
169. Id. at 427. See also Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitu-
tional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922, 956 n.171 (1976), noting that Imbler was bottomed
on broad policy considerations rather than any notions that state immunity was applicable
to its agents.
170. For a series of opinions evincing judicial struggle with the problem of prosecutorial
immunity see Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976), including Judge Lumbard's
concurrence with the Second Circuit's per curiam opinion, where he notes that while Wood
v. Strickland did not control the instant case, it signalled an extension of 1983's reach to
officials who infringed individual rights. He would hold the shield of absolute immunity
unavailable to a prosecutor who goes beyond the scope of his official duties and knows or
.should have known that his actions would deprive a defendant of constitutionally protected
liberties. Id. at 197. See also Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 424
U.S. 961 (1976) (refusing to grant absolute immunity where prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence, since such action not within the scope of his prosecutorial duties).
For an excellent discussion of immunities and defenses under § 1983 see Bryan v. Jones,
530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976) (before a panel of 15 judges en banc) (good faith and
reasonableness are defenses to a 1983 false imprisonment action). See also Hazo v. Geltz, 537
F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976) (sheriff and his deputies not necessarily immune from 1983 suit).
171. E.g., Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor has quasi-judicial
immunity when acting within scope of prosecutorial discretion because prosecutors are more
analogous to judges than policemen).
172. Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
173. Oakley v. City of Pasadena, 535 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1976) (alternative holding).
174. Timson v. Wright, 532 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1976).
175. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
176. Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1976).
177. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976). The federal prosecutors were not
sued under section 1983, but rather on a cause of action first identified in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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This expansion of absolute immunity represents a deviation from
the balancing approach undertaken by the Court in Wood and
Scheuer.'75 While those cases are distinguishable based on the na-
ture of the official function involved, they nevertheless epitomized
a trend to hold public officials accountable for the infringement of
basic constitutional rights.'79 To hold that state officials as a class
are absolutely immune from damage suits under section 1983 would
negate the very remedy section 1983 was intended to provide.'8 ,
Immunity from 1983 suits should be read against the background
of tort law. If tort law's "reasonable man" has traditionally been
viewed as possessing a pool of knowledge that includes an elemen-
tary awareness of the law, certainly a state prosecutor should be
held to a higher standard in view of the nature of his responsibilities.
When a prosecutor purposefully solicits and knowingly uses per-
jured testimony,'"' withholds exculpatory evidence, or otherwise
misuses his office, to shield him from a damage remedy under sec-
tion 1983 can lead to unpalatable results.' 2 A qualified, good faith
immunity, which would protect prosecutors from honest mistakes or
overzealousness, would adequately protect the office and would not
completely eviscerate the purpose of section 1983.
Imbler represents yet another restriction of section 1983, consis-
tent with Rizzo, Paul, and Bishop. The decision is bottomed, how-
ever, on a rationale wholly different from those cases. Each of those
decisions took cognizance of wrongful conduct under color of state
law, but held that injuries resulting from that conduct were not
sufficiently compelling to warrant constitutional protection. In a
case such as Imbler, where the wrongdoer enjoys absolute immun-
ity, the alleged deprivation may have reached the level of a constitu-
tional tort; had the tort-feasor not been clothed with immunity,
1983 would have been available to the injured party. Yet in Imbler,
178. See text accompanying notes 161-65 supra.
179. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
180. See 424 U.S. at 433-34 (White, J., concurring).
181. See Tate v. Grose, 412 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Imbler controlling even though
perjured testimony not only used, but solicited as well).
182. In Dubs v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975 (1976),
a city attorney, justice of the peace, and police chief were sued for damages under § 1983 when
the plaintiff was detained in the local jail while the defendants sold his entire stock of hogs,
worth thousands of dollars, on the pretense of satisfying a $55 misdemeanor fine. All three
defendants were granted immunity for purposes of the 1983 suit; although the action was "in
excess" of their jurisdiction, it was not in the "absence" of that jurisdiction and was within
their general powers under state law. Id. at 592. See also note 181 supra.
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the Court was unwilling to implement section 1983 based on a differ-
ent consideration: the perceived need for a steady flow of fearless
individuals to prosecute criminal activity. As a result, section 1983
is simply unavailable to vindicate important constitutional rights
which may have been lost in the process.
V. Aldinger v. Howard: PENDENT JURISDICTION AND THE MOVE
TOWARDS STATE ADJUDICATION OF SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
Like other Supreme Court decisions which have delimited the
scope of section 1983 based on their perception of Congress' intent
in enacting the Civil Rights Act, statutory interpretation is the
starting point for an analysis of Aldinger v. Howard. ,13 In Monroe
v. Pape,'4 the Supreme Court held that municipal corporations are
not amenable to damage suits under 1983 since they are not "per-
sons" within the meaning of the statute,8 5 and in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno, ,81 it rebuffed efforts to use 1983 to obtain equitable relief
against similar defendants.' 7 Although the Court has held only that
municipal corporations and counties are not suable under section
19 8 3 ,1" lower courts have determined that a wide variety of local
governments and their subdivisions are beyond the reach of the
statute,'8 9 including boroughs,'10 school boards,'9 ' city police depart-
183. 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
184. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
185. Id. at 187-91. See note 187 infra.
186. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). Section 1331 jurisdiction may be available to a person seeking
to hold a municipality liable for damages. Compare 412 U.S. at 514 with id. at 516 (Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., concurring). See generally Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities
for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 922 (1976).
187. The Court observed:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language
actually used by Congress, to suggest that the generic word "person" in § 1983 was
intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the
nature of the relief sought against them.
412 U.S. at 513.
188. See Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 n.1 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973), discussed at note 201 infra.
189. Premised on the realization that 1983 damage actions against individual municipal
officials sued in their official capacity are in effect suits against the municipalities them-
selves, lower courts have held that an action cannot be brought for damages under § 1983
against municipal officials in their official capacities. E.g., Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976) (attempt to sue various officials who promulgated agency
rules concerning mandatory leave for pregnant women). Contra, Muzguiz v. City of San
Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (individual members of pension fund board
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ments and planning commissions,' 2 state boards of probation and
parole,'93 federal agencies,'9 4 and city transit commissions.'95 There-
fore, no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists over these
subdivisions under section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart.' 6
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction;'97 unless a plain-
tiff can show federal jurisdiction over his claim by virtue of a con-
gressional grant of judicial power,'99 he cannot litigate his claim in
federal court. In certain circumstances, however, the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction' 9 may enable a party to obtain a federal forum
for a claim that, standing alone, is not within the statutory jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. A claim is said to be within the pendent
jurisdiction of the federal courts when it is joined with a substantial
claim that independently meets the statutory requirements for fed-
eral jurisdiction, and the claim arises from the same "nucleus of
operative fact" as that of the federal claim. °0
The Supreme Court squarely faced in Aldinger the "subtle and
complex" question it had twice alluded to, 0' but had left
could be sued for monetary damages in their official capacity despite fact money would come
from city pension funds). Cf. Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing
suit against members of municipal agencies acting in their official capacities, but limiting
award to back pay since restitution damages would in effect establish a conduit to the city
treasury).
190. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); Olson v. Borough of
Homestead, 417 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
191. Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
192. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
193. Reiff v. Pennsylvania, 397 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
194. Hoffman v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 519 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.
1975). But see Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1976) (intimat-
ing that some agencies may be "persons" for purposes of § 1983).
195. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Minn. 1976).
196. See note 20 supra.
197. See generally C. WRIGr, FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WRGHTI.
198. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (dictum) ("[jlurisdiction is essen-
tially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a given type of case one way or the
other").
199. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 19; Sullivan, Pendent Jurisdiction: The
Impact of Hagans and Moor, 7 IND. L. REV. 925 (1974); Note, Federal Pendent Party Juris-
diction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA.
L. REV. 194 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pendent Party Jurisdiction].
200. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See notes 209 & 210 infra.
201. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 720 (1975); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 715 (1973).
The issue in Moor was very similar to the question presented in Aldinger. In Moor, the
petitioners sought damages for injuries suffered as a result of the wrongful discharge of a
shotgun by a county sheriff attempting to quell a civil rights disturbance. The petitioners filed
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unanswered: whether pendent jurisdiction can be exercised over a
party such as a municipality for whom no independent basis of
jurisdiction exists. ' In other words, Aldinger confronted the issue
whether pendent party jurisdiction is within the judicial powers of
the federal courts. As in Rizzo, Paul, and other recent civil rights
cases, section 1983 provided the vehicle for resolution of an impor-
tant federal question.
In Aldinger, the plaintiff was dismissed from her employment
with the county despite her admittedly excellent job performance
because she was allegedly living with a male companion. She filed
a federal suit against both the county and the individuals involved
in her discharge, ' 3 and sought injunctive relief and damages under
section 1983. The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction over her federal
claims under section 1343(3), and pendent jurisdiction was alleged
to lie over the state law claims against the parties.0 4 Her 1983 suit
against the individual defendants was properly in federal court, but
since a similar claim under the Civil Rights Act against the county
a § 1983 damage action against the sheriff and other local officials, and sought damages
against the county, claiming it was vicariously liable for the officer's acts under the California
Tort Claims Act. The petitioners asked the lower court to assume pendent party jurisdiction
over the state claim involving the county, since both claims arose from a common nucleus of
operative fact.
The Supreme Court found that the 1983 claim against the individual defendants was
substantial, and that all the claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact. However,
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, noted that the exercise of jurisdiction over the
county would require "the addition of a party which is implicated in the litigation only with
respect to the pendent state law claim and not also with respect to any claim as to which
there is an independent basis of federal jurisdiction." 411 U.S. at 713. Although the issue was
thus squarely approached, the Court evaded a decision on the existence of pendent party
jurisdictional power and upheld the district court's dismissal of the pendent party claim on
the basis of the discretionary criteria set forth in Gibbs. Id. at 716. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966), for the criteria referred to by Justice Marshall in Moor. Moor,
therefore, failed to resolve the question of a federal court's power to exercise pendent party
jurisdiction.
202. 96 S. Ct. at 2415. Lower courts have split over this issue. Compare Aldinger v.
Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1975) (refusing to exercise pendent party jurisdiction
while acknowledging "widespread rejection" of its view), with Haber v. County of Nassau,
411 F. Supp. 93, 96-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (exercising jurisdiction and noting that under the
circumstances, not to exercise such jurisdiction may have constituted an abuse of discretion).
See Pendent Party Jurisdiction, supra note 199, at 206-08 & nn.69-74, collecting the lower
court cases which represent a "model of disarray" since Gibbs.
203. The individual defendants were the county treasurer, his wife and certain named
county officials. 96 S. Ct. at 2415.
204. Id. at 2415-16. The state law claim against the county was said to rest on state
statutes waiving the county's sovereign immunity and rendering the county vicariously liable
for the tortious conduct of its officials. See 513 F.2d at 1358.
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was foreclosed by Kenosha, 25 the plaintiff's only available means of
having all her claims litigated in one judicial proceeding was to have
the federal court exercise "pendent party jurisdiction"2'" over the
state law claim against the county. Distinguishing UMW v.
Gibbs, 07 where the defendant was already properly in federal court,
the Supreme Court held that a federal district court, in an action
brought against a county official under section 1983, has no statu-
tory jurisdiction to join the defendant county; a nonfederal claim
cannot in turn be the basis for impleading a party over whom no
independent federal jurisdiction exists. 28 The plaintiff's state and
federal claims derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact, 2 9
205. See notes 186 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
206. This term, used by Justice Rehnquist in Aldinger, represents a hybrid between the
traditional doctrines of ancillary jurisdiction, which is predicated on the joining of pendent
parties, and pendent jurisdiction, which generally contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction
over additional claims. Compare WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 9, with id. § 19. See also Pen-
dent Party Jurisdiction, supra note 199, at 194 n.2. In Aldinger, Justice Rehnquist found it
unnecessary to decide whether there exists any principled differences between the two types
of jurisdiction. He simply characterized the type of jurisdiction asserted by the plaintiff as
"pendent party jurisdiction"; it is the language in UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26
(1966), a pendent jurisdiction case, on which the lower courts have relied in extending the
type of pendent jurisdiction urged by the plaintiff. 96 S. Ct. at 2419-20. See, e.g., Haber v.
County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93, 96-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding such jurisdiction
relying solely on Gibbs).
207. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
208. 96 S. Ct. at 2418 (emphasis in original). See generally Fortune, Pendent Jurisdic-
tion-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1972); Pendent Party
Jurisdiction, supra note 199, at 196. Both commentators conclude that the exercise of pendent
party jurisdiction is proper in limited circumstances.
209. The crucial language in Gibbs redefining the scope of pendent jurisdiction reads:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim
"arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties" . . .
and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional "case." The
federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of opera-
tive fact. . . . [A]ssuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in fed-
eral courts to hear the whole.
383 U.S. at 725 (footnotes and citations omitted). In Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933),
cited in Gibbs as representing an "unnecessarily grudging" approach to pendent jurisdiction,
the Court held that where two separate causes of action were alleged, only one of which was
federal, federal juducial power did not lie over the state law claim. If two distinct grounds,
one state and one federal, supported a single cause of action, a federal court could dispose of
the case on the nonfederal ground. 289 U.S. at 246. Whereas Gibbs interred this approach to
pendent jurisdiction in favor of a common nucleus test, Justice Rehnquist's "in turn" treat-
ment in Aldinger may represent somewhat of a retrenchment since the plaintiff in Aldinger
was in essence alleging two distinct causes of action: a federal claim against the individuals
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and her claims were such that she would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one proceeding."' Although exercising pendent juris-
diction under these circumstances would be desirable in other con-
texts, in Aldinger this interest was outweighed by the Court's recog-
nition of the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts along with the
perceived congressional intent to negate municipal liability under
section 1983.11 In holding that the petitioner must litigate her state
law claim against the county in state court, the Court seems to have
decided sub silentio a previously unresolved question by implying
that section 1983 claims are not cognizable exclusively in federal
court but may also be entertained by state courts. 12
and a state claim against the defendant county. Although Gibbs did not expressly overrule
Hum, it is clear that Hum's basic approach to pendent jurisdiction was repudiated. 383 U.S.
at 724-25.
210. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 724, 725 (1966). Although there is some uncertainty
from the language of Gibbs, the weight of authority has been that its "common nucleus" and
"ordinarily in one proceeding" requirements must both be met for pendent jurisdiction to
exist. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567,
at 445 (1975), and authorities cited therein.
211. 96 S. Ct. at 2421-22. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, and found the majority's result "demonstrably untenable." In his view, the major-
ity wholly disregarded the congressional intent and policy in enacting the various civil rights
statutes including the present § 1983: The Act's focal point was the provision that claims
brought under § 1983 should be entertained in federal judicial forums. 96 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
212. See 96 S. Ct. at 2421-22; id. at 2430 n.17 (dissenting opinion).
As of 1969, no state court had ever heard a 1983 claim. See Note, supra note 10, at 1497
n.62. As late as 1976 there was still doubt whether Monroe or its descendents, in holding a
1983 suit supplementary to any state remedies, had precluded state courts from entertaining
suits under that section. Backus v. Chilivis, 363 Ga. 500, 224 S.E.2d 370 (1976) (refusing to
decide whether 1983 suits are cognizable in state court but noting that neither Monroe nor
McNeese construed the statute as confining 1983 subject matter jurisdiction to the federal
courts). But cf. Robinson v. Brown, 328 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. 1976) (upholding dismissal of
1983 claim which had already been litigated in federal court because the issue had been
determined by a court of "concurrent jurisdiction"); Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 351
A.2d 187, 190 (1976) (remanding plaintiff's suit against mayor, alleging infringement of first
amendment rights, because "appellant's proper method of recovery would be via 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983").
Other state courts have considered 1983 claims without reference to jurisdictional
impediments. See, e.g., Evans v. Copins, 26 Ariz. App. 96, 546 P.2d 365 (1976) (suit against
city magistrate for false imprisonment and deprivation of other constitutional rights dis-
missed based on judicial immunity); Zisk v. City of Roseville, 56 Cal. App. 3d 41, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1976) (action against city, city planning commission, and individual councilmen);
Knight v. Board of Educ., 38 Ill. App. 603, 348 N.E.2d 299 (1976) (student suing school board
over grade reductions); Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976) (suit against director
of state mental hospital controlled by immunity doctrines enunciated by Supreme Court);
Moore v. City of Pacific, 534 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App. 1976) (suit to invalidate ordinance
establishing allegedly discriminatory ward lines); MacNeil v. Klein, 141 N.J. Super. 394, 358
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The Court's contentment with this result represents a major phil-
osophical change from relatively recent cases which recognized fed-
eral courts as the appropriate forum for the adjudication of these
claims.113 Pendent jurisdiction has consistently been recognized as
a doctrine of judicial discretion."' Although Gibbs and other pen-
dent jurisdiction cases" 5 are distinguishable on the ground identi-
fied by Justice Rehnquist,"' Aldinger could have fit within Gibbs'
requirements for pendent jurisdiction"7 to ensure that the plaintiff's
1983 claim against these individuals for her arbitrary discharge
would be heard in a federal forum with the benefit of federal fact-
finding. Arguably, it is insignificant that Congress intended to insu-
late municipalities from section 1983 liability. The plaintiff sought
to have her state claims against the county adjudicated by the dis-
trict court, and under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction federal
courts surely have the power to adjudicate a state law claim in the
course of disposing of an article III case."'
The policies of economy which underlie the doctrine of pendent
A.2d 488 (1976) (action by county inmates); Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 362 A.2d
486 (Pa. Commw. 1976) (suit against various state police personnel).
It is not at all certain that state courts will adequately protect rights presumably secured
by § 1983. In Jones v. Hilderbrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), the defendant police officer
intentionally shot and killed the plaintiff's 15 year-old son. Citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), which involved distributing a shoplifting flyer, as an "analogous § 1983 case," the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the lower court's damage award of $1500, and dismissed
the 1983 claim, declaring that it had merged with the Colorado wrongful death statute. 550
P.2d at 344. Colorado's wrongful death statute included a "net pecuniary loss rule," restrict-
ing damages to those actually sustained as a result of the death of the appellant's son. Id. at
341. See also text accompanying note 225 infra. But cf. Human Rights Comm'n v. Assad, 349
N.E.2d 341, 344 (Mass. 1976) (dictum) ("excessive use of force by a police officer acting under
color of law is a violation of the 'civil rights' of any victim of that police action").
213. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 247-48 (1967). See also Justice Brennan's strong dissent in Francis v. Henderson, 96 S.
Ct. 1708, 1716 (1976), a habeas corpus case, where he observes that recent decisions of the
Court are stripping the federal judiciary of its responsibility to safeguard and preserve pre-
cious constitutional rights.
214. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
215. For a discussion of the major Supreme Court precedents in this area see Aldinger v.
Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 2416-21 (1976).
216. In Gibbs, the defendant was already properly in federal court and was called upon
to answer nonfederal claims. See id. at 2420. Under § 1983, a county, the entity sued by the
plaintiff in Aldinger, was not properly in federal court since a federal court has no jurisdiction
over suits against counties under §§ 1983 and 1343(3). See 96 S. Ct. at 2421 & n.11.
217. See note 209 supra for the Gibbs formulation. Justice Brennan forcefully argued that
exercising pendent jurisdiction was proper in Aldinger. 96 S. Ct. at 2422-30 (dissenting opin-
ion).
218. 383 U.S. at 725. See note 209 supra.
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jurisdiction are self-apparent. Trying all claims simultaneously ena-
bles the federal court to provide complete justice and achieve an
efficient disposition of the case by avoiding piecemeal litigation.
Convenience and fairness to the litigants invariably result since all
claims are tried in one proceeding. The possibility of inconsistent
results as well as the costs of litigation are decreased. Aldinger's
effect on the average litigant's choice of a forum is painfully clear.
Faced with choosing between litigating all of his claims in one suit
in state court, or suing an individual state official under section 1983
in federal court and then relitigating the identical issues in a state
court suit against the municipality, the typical litigant will proba-
bly forego the latter course and present his 1983 suit for resolution
by a state court. The Court's decision in Aldinger has the potential
to significantly alleviate the federal caseload of section 1983 suits,
but in a wholly different manner than other cases examined in this
.comment. In Paul, Rizzo, Bishop, and Imbler, no cause of action
under section 1983 was made out; therefore there was no case to
adjudicate. By refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction in Aldinger,
the Court has made it economically and practically infeasible to
bring an otherwise appropriate suit to a federal tribunal.
When federal claims under section 1983 are adjudicated in state
courts, the potential is clear that constitutional rights may be lost
in the process. These courts lack experience in dealing with the
statute.219 Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 198820 directs that federal law
shall govern 1983 suits where necessary to achieve the purposes of
the Act. 22' Although federal courts often use state laws interstitially
in areas to which section 1983 does not refer, 2 2 federal common law
219. See note 212 supra.
220. The section states in relevant part:
The jurisdiction . . . conferred on the district courts . . . for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies... [state laws] shall be extended to and govern the said courts ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
221. See generally Comment, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 494
(1970).
222. Compare Meyer v. Frank, 409 F. Supp. 1240, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (in determining
timeliness of 1983 suit, federal court should "borrow" most analogous state statute of
limitation), with Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1976) (one-




should be the referent in matters such as the proper measure of
damages, affirmative defenses, and the various bases of liability
under the Act. 2 3 Once a court has decided as a matter of federal law
that a damage remedy is appropriate to vindicate constitutional
rights, the supremacy clause requires rejection of state defenses that
embody a contrary substantive policy. 24 Yet, at least one state court
decision after Aldinger, in dismissing a 1983 suit, held various police
personnel absolutely immune based on common law notions of sov-
ereign immunity without mentioning the 1983 claim or Supreme
Court cases dealing with immunity granted to police supervisors
and their subordinates.25
The Supreme Court may have been correct in Paul in observing
that every tortious act cognizable as a state tort does not rise to a
constitutional violation. But drawing the line will be no less difficult
in a state court than in a federal one. At least the federal courts have
had occasion to consider this troublesome question in the past.
There is no indication in Aldinger that the Court has paused to
weigh these considerations which may have a debasing effect on
important constitutional rights once selfishly guarded by our federal
courts.2
223. See Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (because constitu-
tional tort is more serious than state law tort, determination of damages is guided by federal
common law of damages); Zisk v. City of Roseville, 56 Cal. App. 3d 41, 127 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1976) (applying federal immunity standards to § 1983 action in state court). But cf. note
225 and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment, Choice of Law Under Section 1983,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 494, 502-12 (1970).
224. See Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 917 (1974) (Stevens, J.) (when construing a federal statute, to give state immunity
defense controlling effect would violate supremacy clause). But see note 225 and accompany-
ing text infra.
Furthermore, deterrence may be a more compelling function of a constitutional tort under
§ 1983 than state tort law, where compensation is of primary concern. See Nahmod, supra
note 87, at 10-11.
225. Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 362 A.2d 486, 488 (Pa. Commw. 1976). In
dismissing the plaintiffs claim against three district attorneys, the court did cite Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See notes 156-82 and accompanying text supra.
226. There are indications that the lower courts are not so willing to relinquish their
statutory duty to vindicate federal rights. See, e.g., McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 759-
60 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1976); Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 434 (8th Cir.
1976); Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D.N.J. 1976).
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VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OF SECTION 1983: SOME SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVES
While leaving undisturbed Monroe, Lynch, Roth, and other land-
mark cases which contributed to the proliferation of section 1983
litigation in federal court, the Supreme Court seems to have suc-
ceeded in emasculating section 1983, unquestionably once an effec-
tive vehicle for combatting constitutional wrongs and compensating
persons for the resulting injuries. Two primary reasons for its deci-
sions were reducing the federal caseload and increasing respect for
our federal system. Another was respect for the Constitution; per-
haps the Court felt the Constitution was being abused when it was
invoked every time a conceivable "liberty" or "property" interest
was allegedly deprived by a representative of a state.
These are unquestionably legitimate concerns for the Court. It is
probably true that every slight deviation from the requirements of
procedural due process, offensive touching of an individual being
searched by a police officer, or wrongful confiscation of a prisoner's
personal property, should not rise to the level of a constitutional
tort. Section 1983 was never intended to reach those concerns and
to extend the Act to such actions may indeed tend to trivialize the
Constitution. 22 Established principles of state contract, property,
and tort law are better suited to redress those wrongs, especially
where it appears the state remedy is adequate in both theory and
practice. Although the Court still recognizes that certain conduct by
state officials should render them amenable to damage suits to com-
pensate persons for any injuries which result, it is not willing to
concede that the Constitution is always the proper vehicle for pro-
viding that redress. In every case discussed in this comment, the
Court observed that the conduct complained of was a predicate, or
at least might be a predicate, for a suit for damages under state law.
This position of the Court is defensible when the rights asserted
are not substantial in constitutional terms. However, cases such as
Rizzo, Paul, and Aldinger were hardly of a trivial nature. On the
contrary, the factual settings presented were precisely the evils
which 1983 was intended to eradicate: class deprivations of constitu-
tional rights as in Rizzo, unfettered and capricious action under
pretense of state law as in Paul, and arbitrary deprivation of impor-
227. See Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 1975)
(expressing such a concern).
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tant property rights at the whim of a state official permitted by a
state statute as in A ldinger.12 Even those who have most forcefully
argued for the imposition of judicial limitations on 1983 suits in
federal court concede that federal jurisdiction is proper in these
circumstances."9 The very essence of the complaint in Rizzo was the
inadequacy of the state administrative remedy;230 to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction under those circumstances is especially re-
pugnant in a civil rights context and ignores one of the express
purposes for the enactment of section 1983.3 '
Reflecting on these recent Supreme Court cases, it becomes diffi-
cult to construct a case where section 1983 is still viable. Nearly
every state official now enjoys a degree of immunity from 1983
suits-some qualified, others absolute.232 Although policemen and
other law enforcement officials do not enjoy a shield of immunity
when their actions are not taken in good faith, their conduct may
not be sufficiently egregious to attain the status of a constitutional
tort.13 Even when an official acts beyond the scope of his immunity,
comity and federalism militate against federal interference with
those responsible for administering local law through an executive
branch of a state or local government.2 34 Supervisory officials are for
practical purposes free from suit under 1983, since rarely, if ever,
can the requisite direct participation be shown. These obstacles to
maintaining a suit under section 1983 are in addition to the practi-
cal difficulties which have always existed in obtaining redress when
constitutional rights have been disregarded.2 35
228. See 96 S. Ct. at 2415.
229. See Note, supra note 10, at 1495-96, 1502.
230. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
231. See note 28 supra.
232. See notes 156-82 and accompanying text supra.
233. See the discussion of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), notes 79-123 and accom-
panying text supra.
234. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976). See text accompanying note 75 supra.
235. It may be difficult to identify the individual officials responsible for a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 964 (1975) (upholding jury verdict for all 69 defendant police officers due to impossi-
bility of determining which of them had fired the fatal and wounding shots): Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279-84 (3d Cir. 1972) (affirming directed verdict for two police officers
alleged to have brutally beaten plaintiff, on ground plaintiff had failed to prove which defen-
dants were the policemen who actually administered the beating). Furthermore, many offi-
cials lack the financial means to pay substantial judgments, thereby negating the utility of a
1983 suit. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) ("Inleither the




In sum, a prospective litigant seeking to utilize section 1983 now
is in a much more difficult position than a former 1983 plaintiff.
Although the present state of the law may not be satisfactory from
the standpoint of protecting individual rights, the Supreme Court's
former stance on 1983 and its relation to the federal system had its
own deleterious effects. In addition to overburdening federal courts,
the bypassing of state remedies ignored the state interest in policing
itself and destroyed the important incentive for states to improve
their own remedies.2 36
The optimum solution is to construe section 1983 in terms of its
original purpose, yet maintaining the statute's usefulness to safe-
guard substantial constitutional rights. Critics of the Supreme
Court's former position on 1983 point out that the statute was not
originally intended to protect rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights-before incorporation those rights were not secured by the
fourteenth amendment.2 31 Yet section 1983 is well suited to safe-
guard those interests when a state official is responsible for their
deprivation. The answer, then, is not to limit 1983, as some have
suggested, to the purposes for which it was enacted in 1871 .13s The
Supreme Court recently rejected a similar course in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.2 31 It concluded that section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, '40 enacted to protect blacks exercis-
ing the freedoms conferred upon them by the fourteenth amend-
ment,2 4' also prohibited racial discrimination aimed at white citi-
zens. Section 1983 should be a readily accessible statute to an indi-
vidual alleging a deprivation of important constitutional rights; the
Act should not be a means for allowing federal courts to ignore the
countervailing state interests,2 2 nor should it be a means for liti-
236. See Note, supra note 10, at 1492-94.
237. See Aldisert, supra note 8, at 572-73.
238. One federal judge has suggested that the Act's appellation, the Ku Klux Klan Act,
itself implies a limited application of § 1983. Id. at 580.
239. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
240. The Act reads in relevant part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State . . . to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
.... 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
241. See Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 94 (D. Conn. 1975) (Con-
gress enacted § 1981 to protect blacks, but whites facing racial discrimination often need the
same protection).
242. See note 236 and accompanying text supra.
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gants to circumvent adequate state remedies in the belief they will
receive more favorable treatment in federal court by alleging a con-
stitutional wrong.
One possible accommodation of the conflicting interests involved
would be to impose an exhaustion rule where the constitutional
right involved is not compelling. The Supreme Court hinted in King
v. Smith43 that it was prepared to impose such a requirement where
the constitutional challenge was not "sufficiently substantial." '
The Second Circuit now requires exhaustion of state administrative
remedies when they appear to be adequate. 45 Imposing an exhaus-
tion requirement, limited to situations where the federal right was
not substantial, would ensure that important constitutional claims
would be litigated in a federal court; but exhaustion contemplates
only a postponement of federal jurisdiction. The burden on federal
courts may not be significantly lessened.
One commentator has advocated a "deferral approach," '46 similar
to an exhaustion requirement, with the important distinction that
in refusing to adjudicate a 1983 claim due to its insignificant status,
the deferral approach contemplates an absence of subject matter
jurisdiction. 47 The difficulty with this alternative is that it may not
provide a workable standard for courts to determine when conduct
is sufficiently flagrant or rights are sufficiently important to warrant
constitutional protection.
The solution which might best accomodate all the competing in-
terests involved is to place some statutory limitation on section
1983. Those who have proposed such a solution concede a lack of
certainty in delimiting the restrictions. 48 One possibility is to repeal
section 1343(3), section 1983's jurisdictional counterpart which has
no minimum amount provision, 49 and engraft an amount in contro-
243. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
244. Id. at 312 n.4. But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (unqualifiedly
observing that the Court has not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative
remedies).
245. Gonzalez v. Shanker, 533 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, Hochman v. Board of
Educ., 534 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1976) (exhaustion of state remedies, whether judicial or admin-
istrative, not required prior to commencing 1983 suit); Sanders v. McCrady, 537 F.2d 1199
(4th Cir. 1976) (exhaustion generally not required because advantages of exhaustion out-
weighed by importance of federal forum for adjudication of federal constitutional rights).
246. Note, supra note 10, at 1498-504.
247. Id.
248. Aldisert, supra note 8, at 577.
249. The text of § 1343(3) appears at note 20 supra.
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versy requirement on claims brought under section 1983. A federal
court would be without subject matter jurisdiction if the claim did
not meet the statutory minimum, thus reducing its caseload by
eliminating trivial claims. Substantial constitutional claims would
still be litigated in federal court and the state executive and judicial
branches would not be denigrated by having federal courts adjudi-
cating tort claims better suited to state disposition. Through this
alternative the delicacy of federal-state relations is respected and
the state's interest in providing its own remedies is left untouched.
Although imposing a minimum dollar amount presents its own diffi-
culties in determining which claims are suitable for federal court,""
it is a far more predictable standard than presently exists for deter-
mining when the constitutional line has been crossed.
One problem left unresolved by this proposal, which may also
require legislative attention, is the granting of judicially created
immunities to certain defendants in 1983 suits. The policy consider-
ations underlying a grant of immunity are clear. Yet as more and
more state officials are accorded absolute immunity from damages,
the Act becomes decreasingly efficacious. A qualified, good faith
immunity for state officials would provide adequate protection for
honest mistakes and preserve 1983's usefulness as an effective
means of redressing constitutional wrongs committed under color of
state law.
Conclusion
In reviewing the history of section 1983 it is important to remem-
ber that it was the Supreme Court, not Congress, that expanded the
scope of the fourteenth amendment through incorporation and
broadened the "under color of state law" language of section 1983
to comport with the expanded scope of state action under that
amendment. It was judicially determined that exhaustion of state
remedies is not a prerequisite to a 1983 suit in federal court, and
that action illegal under state law is no less actionable under the
Civil Rights Act. The cases examined in this comment demonstrate
that the days of expanding the scope of section 1983 have, at the
very least, come to a temporary halt. And, in addition to its deci-
250. See generally P. BATOR & P. MISHKIN, FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1141-
62 (2d ed. 1973).
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sions this term, the Court has granted certiorari in a case 5, which
presents an opportunity to reevaluate the "under color of" language
of section 1983 that has been substantially unaffected since
Monroe.25 Whether the Court will seize the opportunity to further
erode section 1983 remains to be seen. It seems clear, however, that
the Court has already cut deeply into the utility of the Civil Rights
Act as a means of bringing to federal court claims against persons
acting under color of state law who allegedly have violated citizens'
constitutional rights.
JOSEPH P. CARACAPPA
251. Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
In Belcher, an off-duty and out-of-uniform police officer, required by police regulation to
carry a weapon at all times, entered a bar and became involved in an altercation with other
patrons. Without identifying himself as a policeman, he shot and killed two young men and
paralyzed a third. The Sixth Circuit held that the officer was acting under color of state law
within the meaning of § 1983.
252. See generally note 16 supra.
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